Washington and Lee University School of Law

Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Supreme Court Case Files

Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers

10-1976

United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey
Lewis F. Powell Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Election Law Commons

Recommended Citation
United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey. Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 36.
Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Virginia.

This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers at
Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme
Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

UNITED JEWIS H o rzGANIZATIONS OF WJLLIAMSBURGH,
ET AL.

Cert. to CA 2
(Oakes, Kellher; Frankel
dissents)
/J

_/}_

~~~~J~J
~·~ ~ ~s /3v.,Hc_,-s,-to

v.

HUGH L. CArUY , ET AL.

I.

SU!-1111ARY:

Federal/c' ivil

The question is whether a New York state redj std ct ·

--

ing plan (undertaken after the Department of Justice had disapproved
~

the previous plan as possibly discriminatory) which was specjfically

2/Pursuant to extensions granted by Marshall, J. and Blackmun, J.

'
(

-2-

drawn to create districts with at least a 65% black majority,

is

unconstitutional in the fac e of a challenge by the Hasjdic community
asserting that the plan discriminates against them, as an ethnic
voting bloc and as
II.

FACTS:

whi ~ es.

Kings County New York has a 65% white and 35% non-

(bl ack & Puerto Rican) population.

white

in Bedford-Stuyvesant.

Most of the non-whites live

However, by dividing up this area and pa;ring

the divisions with larger, surrounding white areas,

it has been pos-

sible to fix it so that the non-whites were in the minority in
of the SenPl.te and 77% of the Assembly districts,

8~/c

(the exceptions

being right in the heart of the ghetto).
New York sought to redistrict in 1972 but, for reasons not
challenged here, the USDC (D. D.C.) determined that the reapportionment plan must be approved by the
pursuant to § 5 of the Voting Rights Act.

R

~n~

~~~new
~

Attorney General

That approval was

withheld , apparently because the New York plan perpetuated the

~~ status

fq'1V

u.s.

quo outlined above+fand New York had to come up with a

plan before they could hold another election.
Although the A.G. made no formal recommendations as to the

new plan, the New York officials "got the feeling" through
informal contacts that they should carve out some districts with
l/The stated reason for disapproval, a model of non-information, was
that "we cannot conclude . • · • that (this plan) will not have the
effect of abridging the right to vote on account of race or color . . ·

-3-

at least 65% no11-white majorities.

This they djd, giving Kings

County 3 of 10 Senate districts and 7 of 22 Assembly districts
' h non-w h't
.
't' 1/ T h'lS pan
1
w1t
1 e maJOrl-les.
was approve db y th e A.G.
In the process they cut in half the Hasidic community which,
under the old plan and the pre-1972 setup, had been contained in
a single district.

Prior even to the A.G.'s approvai of the plan

the Hasidin} (petrs here)
U.S.D.C.

sought a temporary restraining order :in

(ED N.Y. -- Bruchhausen, J) which was denied.

Subsequently

the DC denied a preliminary injunction holding that petrs'

suit

was "untenable" because only political subdivisions could bring
uctions under the Voting Rights Act.

[See 42

u.s.c.

§

CA 2 rejected this reasoning by the USD0holding,
that the
§

1973(c)

n~medy

1973(c)J
in . effect ,

nfforded to states and political subdivis:i ons by

is not exclusive and private parties may seek traditional

injunctive relief (but may not sue pursuant to § 5 of the Voting
Rights Act) citing Allen v. Bd. of Education, 393 U.S. 544, 549-50
(1969) •

However, they did hold that § 5 bars a suit against the

A.G., a holding which petrs do not protest.
Next CA 2 turned to the standing question.

They held that
~- ---.__)

petrs lacked standing as meniliers of an ethnic bloc noting that
--------.;

1/The SG poin1. s out that the percentage of non-white dominated
districts is now approximately equal to the percentage of nonwhite population in the county, i.e. 30 - 40%.

-4there were so many ethnic blocs in Kings County that to suffer

-

them all the right to protest would create havoc.
s peciiicall~rotest

Petrs do not

this holding here~ though they still seem to complain about it.

Ho~ever,

I

L

CA 2 found standing for petrs as representatives
...........

of the white community especially where, as here, the white
voters are members of a racial-political minority in the districts
in question.
On the merits CA 2 noted that th~re was no showing that the
voting strength of white voters had been unduly diluted
percentages quoted above).

(see the

Thus the question became whether

districting on racial lines is per se unconstitutional. CA 2
agreed with petrs that the redistricting had in fact been performed
solely along racial lines.

However, they concluded that the Voting

Rights Act contemplated such cc·l 0r-oriented

actiC ~r:_ the

\ effective way to correct past discrimination.

1

only

They thus concluded

that redistricting done solely on the basis of race is not per se
unconstitutional.
Judge Frankel dissented pointing out that it was unclear what
the "wrong" was which was being corrected or whether the 65% quotas
would in fact right that "wrong."

No hearings were held or fjnd-

ings made as to whether the non-whites were in fact injured by the
old system or benefitted by the new.
He then stated that such a race-oriented quota system is
"odius" in our society and argues that non-whites, a minority of
~

\

.

,.

-535~ have

districts

no constitutional right to a majority in 35% of the
(with the prGsumed consequence of having 35% of the

----~

legislators from the county being non-white).
III.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr cites City of Richmond v. U.S.,

No. 74-201 (d e c. 6-24-75)

in which a majority held that "voting

changes taken with the purpose of denying the vote on the grounds
of race or color" are invalid no matter what their actual effect
might be.

Petr also contends that Beer v. U.S.

(No. 73-1869 set

for reargument this Term) presents similar issues.

Finally petrs

argue, as did Frankel, J., below, that there has been no finding
of any past discrimination which required correction and no
rational relationship between the form of the remedy and the
nature of the discrimination it allegedly corrects.
The SG essentially tracks the arguments of the majority belm\r.
IV.

DISCUSSION:

Contrary to petrs' contentions the plan

challenged here seems to have the same result as the plan approved
in City of Richmond, supra.

That is, non-whites have majorities

in

a percenta ge of districts which is roughly equal to their percenta qe
of the total population.
Query, however,

City of Richmond, Slip Op. p. 12.

if the rule is that minorities are entitled

representation in the legislature according to their percentage
representation in the community (which is the basic thrust of this
case & City of Richmond) does it not follow that,

if 45% of the

population are Republicans, they are entitled to 45%
in Congress?

I

f '

representatio~

;
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The point is that the ruling of this case is that minorities
are now entitled to more than minorities have ever gotten in the

}A

Here they apparently were actually gerrymandered into a

past.

U\ more
have

favorable position than the natural order of things would

ordained~

CA 2 approved it as a correction of past wrongs,

but as petr points out, nobody has proved that such "wrongs" will
be corrected by this action.

A d{fficult case but probably settled

by the dictum in City of Richmond.
There is a response.
10/6/75

Bradley

Op in Pets App

1/Nobody specifically admits that this is the case, but it seems
to be the tacit basis of CA 2 1 s decision.

....,, '

..

.- .
Discuss, join 3.

I have read the CA 2 opinion and the papers.

There

are excellent XKKJXX lawyers on both sides, and they have succeeded
in presenting a difficult case in all its complexity!
I would suggest xkx that you read Judge Frankel's

dissent, Petition 32a-50a, and then read the Brief for
Respondents in Opposition 3-10.

That is about 25 pages of

reading, but I believe it is necessary for you to get a real
feel for the issues.

Judge Frankel gives the best argument
~

for striking down the dt istricting plan, while the

Rx~BHK&Hxxx

Respondents present a clear and cogent argument that the plan
is just fine.

________________

There seem to be ..__
two real issues.
plaintiffs have standing?
an ethnic group.

First, do these

They are whites, and members of

As ethnics, they have been split into ~tve~~\

. . . voting districts where previously they had been in one.
But k this doesn't harm them socially in any way, i since the
division is purely on paper and they still have a community.
So

t~

has to be

But HXBH even before

the split they were all in a district that had a 61.5 %nonwhite
majority.

After the split (which really results in four districts,

two for Senate and two for Assembly elections), xkex they are in
three districts with nonwhite majorities ranging from 65% to
88.1%, and in one district with a white majority of 65.3%.

So

it's kind of difficult to say that the have been hurt as voters,
------------vofers
- ------- - whether looked at as ethnic HBxexx or as white voters--either way,

f

-.z.-

they were in the minority before and

in the miHBix1qr:

xmXHXI!l minority now (except in the one district with a white
majority).

question becomes

Assuming standing, the

~HexxiBHxBREI!lme

whether there

was anything impermissible about what the State did.

What

they did, basically, was sit BBR down and (1) assume block
a~paxaxx

voting along racial lines (which had
the case in the past), (2)

apparently been

look at the percentages of whites

and nonwhites in the whole Kings County, and (3)

draw district

lines so that nonwhites of voting age would be in a majority

--

·- ........_______

-------~-------

in a percentage of the total number o
~ ~~---------------

-

--~~XBximaxi

districts

--

approximately equal to their percentage of the total population
---......____

-

--..__...

---...

......

-- -- --

in the County. (At the latter stage, apparently, they allowed

--

~---

for census figures that showed a lower percentage of nonwhites
above voting age than the percentage of whites above voting age.
Because of this, they drew the lines to insure supermajorities
(i.e., above 65%) of nonwhites in certain districts, in order to
insure axxx at least a majority of nonwhite voters in thffie
districts.

The plaintiffs, of course, contend that the iii 65%

figure was just pulled out of the air because the State officials
"got the feeling" that was the figure the Justice Department
would accept.

That appears ludicrous to me, but we may find

from the full record that it's true.)
. was
The aim of the line drawing xax apparent l y~ o attempt to
insure election of nonwhite candidates from some of the districts.
The question is whether

system is permissible in the

context of this case .
.....____.-._~

City of Richmond does not control.

In Part II of that

-3-

opinion the Court said that the change from at-large election
to ward elections, in conjunction with Richmond's annexation,
saved the annexation under § 5 because it kept it from having
the effect of denying or abridging the xigkx blacks' right
to vote.

It is true that the wards there were drawn so that

a percentage of them would have substantial black majorities,
and that that percentage corresponded very xaga roughly to the
percentage of blacks

~n

the city after annexation.

e- ..... /~v\

Thus, the

Court did H condone drawing lines with racial purposes in mind.
--------....___ The difference x between Richmond and this EKe case, however,

------------------------

is the question presented to the Court by the line-drawing.
In RiEkamaRi Richmond, the question was whether, given the
wards as drawn, the Court could

dicl hot have.

say that the annexation

plan as a whole . . .Athe effect of denying or abridging kaiEkx
black voting

x rights.

Here, the question is whether the

line-drawing was necessary to correct past wrongs, and if so
whether that necessity justified it.

Given that difference,

I do not believe Richmond makes consideration of this case
redundant.
As to the answer to the question presented by the linedrawing in this case, I remain quite confused.

Plaintiffs

claim that it was unjustified because there has been no finding
of prior discrimination that the line-drawing was to remedy.
'

---

-

Respondents try to get around this argument by pointing to the
1972 redistricting that failed to pass the AG, claiming that
that redistricting was discriminatory against blacks, and
arguing that there was no way to "remedy" that discrimination

J

-4-

without considering racial composition of the districts
to be created by the 1974 plan.

The problem with Respondents'

argument is that the 1972 lines never

KHR

went into effect,

so one can't point to their discriminatory effect at all.

Thus,

the 1974 lines challenged here were not drawn to remedy any
discriminatory effect of the previously proposed plan, and we
must look somewhere else for the previous discrimination.
is true that district lines in Kings County

ap~eaxxa

It

appear to

have been drawn from time xmmemaixaix immemorial with the
purpose of keeping blacks from having majorities in any districts,
or many districts.

But I am not so sure that this "common

knowledge" has been reduced to a finding anywhere in this
litigation, and even if it had I'm not sure it would be relevant.
came
This challenged redistricting Eam about simply BREKX because

·-- --------------------------------------------------------The ground for that

the AG refused to approve the previous one.

disapproval, under the Act and as given, was that the AG could
not say that the plan did not have a discriminatory effect.

1 AG did not say that it did have one, either.

The

And he certainly mi

made no judgment as to previous districtings in Kings County.
So, all his disapproval required the County to do was come up
with a new plan that did not discriminate against nonwhites.
His disapproval can hardly be pointed to as justification for
quotas of any sort. ( But on the other hand, one doesn't want to
tie the AG's and a State's hands in working out a plan that will
not have a discriminatory effect against nonwhites, and it may
be easiest for them at times to sit down with figures and
drawing paper and play the percentages as they did here.

It is

.

.-5-

XEHxxaikx~

certainly difficult for me, at least, to think of

some way they could avoid a discriminatory a£££E effect
against nonwhites without paying attention to the percentage
figures for various districts )

Phil
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July 26, 1976

No. 75-104, United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh vs.
Carey (Governor of New York), NAACP, et al.

This memorandum, dictated after a preliminary look at
the briefs, is intended only as an "aid to memory" that will refresh my recollection when I return to a more careful study of
the case prior to argument and decision.

When an opinion is

expressed or intimated, it is wholly tentative.

* * * *
This is a rather complex "redistricting" case : from New
York that has been in the courts for some time.

It is here on

certiorari to CA2 where the 1974 legislative redistricting of
Kings County, following disapproval by the Attorney General under
the Civil Rights Act of 1965 of a 1972 plan, was sustained by a
majority of CA2 (Oakes), with a dissent by Frankel.
The two opinions, majority and dissenting, of the Circuit Court, and the briefs filed by petitioners (the Miller, Cassidy
firm) and by the respondents-intervenors (NAACP) provide a comprehensive -- if at times confusing -- account of this case and its

• •

2.

No. 75-104

issues.

The other briefs, including that filed on behalf of

Governor Carey, are not helpful.

In view of the thorough opinions

and briefing, however, I will not attempt in this memorandum to
record for myself a coherent account of the history of the case,
its relevant facts, or the various arguments.

In brief

sum-

mary, the case is as follows:

The Situation and the suit
Portions of New York, unlike most states outside of the
South, are subject to Section V of the Voting Rights Act.

Commen-

cing in 1970, the State of New York and the Attorney General (Department of Justice) have been "sparring" -- and litigating -- over
the effect of the Act on certain redistricting, including Kings
County.
General.

The 1972 New York plan was disapproved by the Attorney
Responding to this disapproval, a special emergency

session of the New York legislature in May 1974 adopted a new plan,
which was

approv~d

by the Attorney General.

This case presents an

attack on the constitutionality of that plan.
The district lines at issue here were largely influenced,
if not in effect dictated, by the Justice Department.

Judge Oakes,

for CA2, noted:
These lines were drawn, Richard s. Scolaro,
the executive director of the Joint Committee
on Reapportionment testified below, to comply
with Justice Department criteria, informally
discussed over the telephone and in person,
that there be three senate and two assembly

3.
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districts with "substantial nonwhite
major it'ies." Because the assembly district in which the entire Hasidic community
was located under the 1972 apportionment had
a nonwhite population of 61.5 per cent and
the Justice Department indicated this was insufficient, Mr. Scolaro "got the feeling,"
although the number was not specifically
referred to, that a 65 per cent nonwhite
majority would be approved. Under the 1974
reapportionment plan devised and approved
the Hasidic community was divided almost
in half, placed in Assembly Districts 56
and 57 and Senate Districts 23 and 25.
Assembly District 56 as redrawn contains
88.1 per cent nonwhite population, Assembly
District 57 contains 65.0 per cent nonwhite
population, Senate District 23 contains
71.1 per cent nonwhite population, Senate
District 25 contains 34.7 per cent nonwhite
population.

This suit was instituted by petitioner as representative
of the Hasidic community of Kings County, described as a closely
knit community of Jewish citizens most of whom escaped Nazi persecution, and have lived in what is called the Williamsburgh area
since they immtgrated to this count!Y·

The

complaint avers that

it was unconstitutional to dilute the vote of the Hasidic community
by dividing it in half.

The Court of Appeals correctly resolved

this issue by holding that no specific ethnic or racial group is
entitled to preserve community political integrity.

This aspect

of the case was resolved by CA2, and is not pressed on this appeal.

The Questions Presented
The best statement of the question presented is found in

.,

4.
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petitioners' brief, as follows:
1. Whether the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments were violated by a deliberate racial
gerrymander under which election lines were
drawn on a racial basis to secure ten districts
with white voting populations at 35 percent or
less.
2. Whether such a gerrymander was rendered
constitutional by the fact that it was carried
out under the instructions of the United States
Department of Justice, purporting to implement
the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
3. Whether a racial gerrymander can be
viewed as "corrective action" to remedy past
discrimination if there has been no affirmative
finding by any court or government agency that
there was past voting discrimination which
required correction and if there is no rational
relationship between the form of the remedy and
the nature of the discrimination it assertedly
"corrects."

Petitioners' brief argues, as a separate issue, each of
these questions.
arguments.

The NAACP respondent .' s brief presents the opposing

The issues are important and far-reaching, and not with-

out considerable difficulty.

At this time, I will merely comment

on them quite briefly.
It is asserted by petitioners, and not denied, that this
is "the first case in which there is absolutely no factual dispute
as to the legislature's dominant purpose or motive."

As CA2 stated

the central issue is whether an apportionment "specifically drawn
to ensure nonwhite voters a 'viable majority'" is permissible under
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.

It is thus conceded, in

effect, that although the plan was not directed in any way against

No. 75-104

5.

the Hasidic community as such, that community was divided -- and
placed in separate state senate and assembly districts -- solely
because they were white.

Absent such a division, these new districts

would not have had at least 65 percent nonwhite voting population
prescribed as the goal for the redistricting.
As petitioners put it rather starkly
If the petitioners' skin were black,
brown, red or yellow, the apportionment
challenged here would never have reached
this Court. Any federal judge mindful of
his oath to enforce the Constitution would
instantly strike down a districting scheme
which was flagrantly designed to keep
blacks, Chicanos, Indians or orientals at
not more than 35 percent of an election
district.
Petitioners then present "three alternative grounds" for
the alleged invalidity of the legislation:
1.

As the broadest ground, it is argued that "there is

never any justification for race-consciousness in the electoral
process."

Petitioners conced= that the court has sustained race-

oriented legislation with respect to public education and employment "to undo the effects of past discrimination" or to prevent
its perpetuation.

But "no seniority builds up in voting" and "no

established attendance or assignment patterns develop over the
years of racial discrimination as they do with regard to public
school students and teachers."

Hence,

it is argued that once racial

gerrymandering has been shown, the cure "is fair non-racial apportionment -- not districting designed to maximize the voting power of

6.

No. 75-104

blacks, Puerto Ricans, or any other minority."
2.

Petitioners' second argument assumes, arguendo, that '

there may be some situations where racial redistricting is supportable to correct "past discrimination."

It is argued, however,

that there has been "no finding by any judicial or administr.ative
body [in this case] that there was racial discrimination in the
drawing" of past district lines in Kings County.

As noted, the

record shows that in one of the districts at. issue in this case,
nonwhites numbered 61.4 percent of the total population under the
1972 reapportionment, suggesting no discrimination in voting against
this large nonwhite majority.
3.
the three)

The third alternative argument (the most narrow of

is related to the particular quota system urged by the

Department of Justice and adopted by the New York Legislature.
Even if one accepts that (i) race-oriented legislation may be
justified in some electoral districting and (ii) there was in fact
past racial discrimination in Kings County that warranted some
compensatory racial remedy, petitioners argue that "the record
as well as human experience -- is devoid • • • of any justification
for the remarkable 'quota' remedy undertaken by the New York
Legislature."

This is the focus of Judge Frankel's dissent.

There

had been no finding

by the legislature or a court -- that the
remedy
65 percent quota was a necessary or an appropriate/for the objections

raised by the Attorney General.

Judge Frankel concluded that :."hhere

No. 75-104
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is no semblance of justification" for the 65 percent quota.
Petitioners here rely on Milliken v. Bradley for the
proposition that the remedy in a racial discrimination case designed to correct past segregated conduct may not substantially
exceed in scope the constitutional violation found to have been
committed.

This concept goes back to Swann.

Respondent's Answers
The brief on behalf of the NAACP undertakes to answer
the foregoing contentions, relying heavily on the purpose of the
Voting Rights Act and on the perceived rationale of several of
our reapportionment cases including, particularly, White v. Regester,
412

u.s.

755.
The NAACP argues that the 1974 lines, adopted to conform

to the Attorney General's views, were not unfair to whites.

Although

the lines drawn resulted in five new districts with nonwhite majorities,
"white candidates were elected in four of these districts."

It was

emphasized that the racial mix of the population necessarily had
to be considered, under the Civil Rights Act and the Attorney
General's view in drawing the new lines.
Respondent NAACP noted, correctly I think, that there
was certainly no showing of past discrimination against whites,
and no past exclusion of them from access to the political processes,
such as were noted in White v. Regester with respect to the black
population.

No. 75-104
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The respondent-intervenors defend the appropriateness
of the 65 percent quota remedy by reference, not so much to specific discrimination or intentional exclusion of blacks as by
reference to general black-white ratios : in various districts in
New York prior to 1974.

These ratios indicate that the non-white

community had been fragmented in many instances, and paired with
larger white areas,

in a way that substantially diluted the black

vote.

Comment
The briefs in this case, as well as the opinion of CA2,
are rather "long" on arguments and "short" on the citation of
relevant authorities and legal analysis based thereon.
Subject to rereading the major decisions of this Court
that may be relevant (e.g., Regester, City of Richmond, Whitcomb),
and to advice from my clerk, I am inclined to think that the Voting
Rights Act -- if not our prior decisions -- dispose of petitioners'
first, sweeping assertion that "there is never any justification
for race consciousness in the electoral process."
Petitioners' second and third arguments present more
difficult issues, as is made clear -- at least to me -- by Judge
Frankel's dissenting opinion.

If indeed there is no finding by

any judicial or administrative body that there was racial discrimination in drawing former district lines in

B~ooklyn

(Kings County),

No. 75-104
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is there justification for the lines being drawn deliberately to
place the white voters at a serious percentage disadvantage?

In

answering this question, to what extent is the view of the Attorney
General on the Voting Rights Act relevant?
respondents, determinative?

Is it, as argued by

I would have thought that it is

certainly relevant, as the Act applies to Kings County, but this
would not necessarily answer a Fourteenth Amendment attack on the
ground that -- as applied -- the Act was violative of the equal
protection rights of the whites.
The third argument, that won Judge Frankel's vigorous
endorsement, is still more narrowly focused.

Is there anything

in the record that supports the necessity for, or rationality of,
the 65 percent quota system in relation to the legislative purpose?
Indeed,

if the legislative purpose is a "legitimate one," is there

a reasonable relationship between the purpose and the "classification"
(the 65-35 minimum ratio) adopted?
I add, for the benefit of my clerk or clerks, that my own
"bias" is against "quota systems" as either a constitutionally
required, or a socially justifiable, resolution of most race
discrimination cases.

In the voting area particularly, the under-

lying assumption that blacks and whites votes as separate blocs is
-- in my opinion
empiric data.

fallacious and unsupported by the most relevant

See, e.g., petitioners' brief, p. 29-33.

Moreover,

I agree with petitioners that blacks also can be -- and in many

No. 75-104
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instances have been -- effectively represented by whites and
vice versa.

These generalizations are supported by my own ex-

perience and participation in campaigns in Richmond.

There is

evidence (some of which I have personally seen) that black
citizens tend to vote more as a "bloc" than do white citizens,
but this does not mean that if a white is elected to office -despite the bloc voting against him -fail to represent the black constituents.

he will ignore or
One usually may safely

count on a politician to make conscious appeals to --certainly
not to ignore -- any major,
his constituen9y.

identifiable group of voters among

A well organized minority often is far more

influential in the political process than is the unorganized,
disparate, and often relatively disinterested white majority.
More fundamentally,

in the long view our democratic

processes will be strengthened by bringing the races together,
not by creating and perpetuating a consciousness of continuing
apartheid.
Despite these generalized (and perhaps irrelevant) observations, I would like for the clerk assigned to this case to
identify more precisely than I have the most relevant Supreme
Court authorities, and indicate to me the directions in which
these authorities point.

There is, I believe, no controlling

decision but perhaps the guiding principles can be distilled from
these precedents.

-

BENCH MEMO

•
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To: Mr. Justice Powell
From: Dave Martin

1'17b

No. 75-104, United Jewish Organizations of
Williamsburgh, Inc., et al. v. Carey, et al.

I began my consideration of this case in much the
same frame of mind that I detect in your "aid tcjnemory"
memorandum.

I think quotas are generally wrong, even if

they are ostensibly benigft.

Moreover, to talk about any

reapportionment plan (I am thinking in particular here of
the 1972 plan) as diluting a racial group's voting( strength
or effectiveness comes very close to assuming, and perhaps
implicitly encouraging, racial blo ~ voting.

Naturally

there is some reality to bloc voting, but it is

wron~

to build public policy on the assumption that i4will
continue and even become more entrenched.

See Wrisht

v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 66 (Douglas, J., dissenting);
cf. Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S.
Louisiana's requirement that

~

399, 402 (invalidating

a candidate's race be printed

on the ballot next to his or her name).
I have concluded, however, that reversal here would
be a mistake.

New York was clearly conscious of race in

drawing the 1974 lines, but it is unrealistic

~

to

think that such consciousness could ._ have been completely purged.

Moreover, although the legislature

was conscious of race, there is really no claim that it
exercised its consciousness in an invidious attempt to
disadvantage whites.

The purpose was not to harm whites.

Nor was the effect to harm whites, if we focus--as we
should--on the reapportionment plan as a whole and not
jut on the districts where New York admittedly labored

to create a 35% white population.

-2In addition, I do not think the issues have come
to us framed in the most relevant form.

The parties and

CA2 assumed that a Swann/Milliken analysis governs.

I

tend to think that the more traditional reapportionment
cases, particularly Whitcomb v. Chavis, provide the relevant
standards.
I conclude that xka CA2 should be affirmed, or
perhaps that the xxixa writ xk should be dismissed as
improvidently granted.

I do not think this is the kind

of quota case the Court thought it was when it granted
review.
Before I focus specifically on the three claims
petitioner has presented, it is appropriate to review
the

New York was acting in response to the AG's
objection to its 1972

a~~xs

apportionment.

Assuming

for the moment that that objection amounted to a
finding of improper racial gerrymandering, one might
well argue that the way to correct the problem is simply
to draw the lines with an eye that is color-blind.

In

fact, petitioners suggest exactly this, that the cure
"is fair non-racial reapportionment--not districting
designed to maximize the voting power of blacks, Puerco
Ricans, or any other minority."

3
~

If I thought color-blind

realistically

districtingA~xxsi~x

possible, then I might well join petitioners in striking
down the 1974 plan on the broadest ground they xsggexxx
urge.

But I do not think that color-blindness is a

realistic expectation in aixxxi£xxRgx the reapportionment

~~~s re.~
A from, say,

drawing is taken over by •judges--or even then, unless
the judge appoints a special master from ssxxsfxx a
distant city who knows nothing of the local community and
is denied

aR~ access t~nformation ~p showing

gross population figures.
Reapportionment is undeniably a political process.
~

There are • nearl~infinite number of ways to draw up
districts with equal

popu~ion.

ixxx8Kftxae different political,
implications.

Legisla~

Each

variatio~ill

racia~,

have

and ethnic

are bound to know something

--~ \r ~\v jo\,-about the communities affected~ and they are bound to

have a t least a rough awareness of those political,

"""
racial, and ethnic implications before any plan is
enacted.
In Gaffney v. Cummings, k93 412 U.S. 735, the
Court had to face a contention that

distticts~hould

4
be drawn with an eye that is "party-blind."

The context

is a bit different from the one we have here, but I
think the Court's recognition of the realities applies
~ C4"Ascioi/S'-'&v
v'-a.. 'l M irs"'-£ .

4)r

We are quite unconvinced that the reapportionment
plan offered by the three-member Board violated the
Fourteenth Amendment because it attempted to reflect
the relative strength of the parties in locating and defining election districts. It would be idle, we think, to
contend that any political consideration taken into account in fashioning a reapportionment plan is sufficient
to invalidate it. Our cases indicate quite the contrary.
See White v. Regester, supra; Burns v. Richardson,
supra; Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra; Abate v. Mundt,
supra. The very essence of districting is to produce a.'
different-a more "politically fair"- result than would be
reached with elections at large, in which the winning
party would take lOOo/o of the legislative seats. Politics__
and political considerations are inseparable from districting and apportionment. The political profile of a State,
its party registration, and voting records are available
precinct by precinct, ward by ward. These subdivisions
may not be identical with census tracts, but, when overlaid on a census map, it requires no special genius to recognize the political consequences of drawing a district
line along one street rather than another. It is not only
obvious, but absolutely unavoidable, that the location
and shape of districts may well determine the political
complexion of the area. District lines are rarely neutral
phenomena. They can well determine what district will
be predominantly Democratic or predominantly Republican, or make a close race likely. Redistricting may pit
incumbents against one another or make very difficult
the election of the most experienced legislator. The ·
reality is that districting inevitably has and is intended _
to have substantial political consequences.
It may be suggested that those who redistrict and re:
apportion should work with census, not political, data
and achieve population equality without regard for
political impact. But this politically mindless approach
may produce, whether intended or not, the most grossly
gerrymandered results; and, in any event, it is most
unlikely that the political impact of such a plan would
remain undiscovered by the time it was proposed or
adopted, in which event the results would be both known
and, if not changed. intended.

----

-5-

-

If it is unrealistic to expect reapportionment

to proceed without awareness of racial consequences,
then it is surely wrong to strike down a plan that
marked by such awareness--even though, admittedly
resulted from a processAKR£X£X8H£RX~SRK~i~HKRHKKXNRK
j
, that awareness here was
RXBiXX~XHXHX~

than is common.

robably far more explicit

£XXXHX~ii~iXXXRRRXX H~XXXXHKHR ~XX

Ob~viously
v

this does not mean that

~ abandon~ all review of reapportionment plans, but

it counsels x~me caution and restraint in reviewing
xkax~iaRK equal-population plans when they are

challenged as unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
or Fifteenth Amendment.

The cases support this view.
~ trong

a

It requires quite

----------------------showiqg
to have a plan invalidated

reasonably equal

~O£ ulati6n

(a~ ng

among districts) by a

court on constitutional grounds.

~

(Cases under §5

of the Voting Rights Act are a different matter.)
I set out the most important cases below.

The best

general discussion I have found is Justice Stevens'
-.---"_..;,.
dissent in Cousins v. City Council, 466 F.2d 839, 847
...

(CA7 1972).

It is 14 pages long, but it is well worth

reading.
The first significant case involved an outrageous
redrawing of municipal boundaries.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S.

Gomillion v.

339. ----------------------------------------~~~

~xaxkaaxaaaRxaxaaaaxaxw

The case arose on the pleadings ,

and the court held that the plaintiff had alleged enough
to get to trial.

There has been ongoing debate

~

about

whether Gomillion announced a standard looking to

~islative purpose

or

t~essary effect--but the

results there were so extreme xkax (all but four
blacks were districted out of Tuskegee's city limits;
all whites
difference.

remained~inside)

that it did not make much

The standard announced was that . . action

of this sort is invalid if it "fences out" particular
groups.

That standard, however, is not very helpful for
the usual legislative districting case.
was an extreme case.

First, Gomillion

The result was so blatantly segre-

gative that it fairly cried out for invalidation.

More

importantly, Gomillion involved a city's boundaries,
not legislative districting.

Those outside the boundaries

had no vote whatever on city affairs.

For state legis-

lative apportionment, RHMaxax by contrast, a group
fenced out of one district is simply fenced into another.

7

a.!:s LI±t E s iza!'§ly •
A

a

3

Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, presented
a like question in the legislative setting. RlaiRxiffxsx

~~~ tTJ
«~HRset sa~e 1 ~Athe

Congressional districts on Manhattan.

Plaintiff's counsel argued that all the Court had to
determine was whether the lines were drawn with racial
considerations in mind and whether the effect was to

l.u. ~ )
create racially segregated districts.
were unConstitutional.

so~the

lines

The facts aff~xaea tended to show

that the lines were thus drawn.
xesaixsx~fxaixi

If

But the

«~HXkxxeaaxake

three-judge DC divided confusingly.

Th~

Court read the rhree opinions as meaning that the
DC did not find that the New York legislature "was either
motivated by racial considerations or in fact drew the
~ Y+ 0.~ ~ ~·~~.
districts on racial lines."

~·

at 56.

A.Later

it phrased

the test a bit more narrowly:

did the lines amount to

a "contrivance to segregate"?

Id. at 57.

Justices

Douglas and Goldberg dissented, saying the lines could
only be explained in racial terms.

Justice Douglas

eloquently marshaled the arguments against racial linedrawing.
377

u.s.

-

Id. at

533 .

66~~ri~ht predated Reynolds

v. Sims,

.,>--.-------------?--:::::

8

Once Itone person, one vote' ' was established, the Court
might conceivably have stopped there.

each
As long as all

carrieg
vote"" . . II ·

•·--~numerically

equal

~SMHX

force,

:s

and as long as the iituation,.._Anot as outrageous
as Gomillion, ix one could make a strong claim that the
~~~ (Jw.~
RaHXK court's role is at an end.

The most

any..-~ould

do would be to fiddle with district lines with
arguable negative impact on this group or that--but the
negative impacts would be so arguable that there would

-

be no gall cause for court intervention.

Cf. Wright

the black
v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. at 58 (noting that/plaintiffs
wanted more even dispersal of minority votes among
d~ tricts, whereas intervenors--Adam Ciayton Powell and

others--supported concentration).*
-'=

6£

....
6 GE1fll:~
fJ8U81!

(Sa

'iR

•iii!'[doo•!Ei8'8

t\

C U!i88P-;V"

Whatever the merit of that position, it did not
catch on.

The Court continued to hold out the prospect

of xexiRN invalidation where a plan wax had the effect

~ t,flftfi'" "

of 'diluting'' the voting power of given graps .A -e usually
arose in cases attacking multi-member districts.

Fortson

v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, and Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S.
73,

keiaxxkaxxaxxxaxexwaxxRaxxxa~Hixea

approved multi-

member districts in the xxaxaxaRR Georgia and Hawaii
plans, but they indicated that

~laRKXWaHlBXBHXXRX

such

9

districts would be invalidated if they were employed
"to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial
or political elements of the voting population."
Fortson, 379 U.S., at 439; Burns, 384 U.S., at 88.
analytical
There were a lot of/problems
aaaxgefiRiki~RK

formulation.

«~R«&XRiRgxass~xi~s

buried in that deceptively

simpl~

They all came home to roost in Whitcomb

"£~ 1'[;;.

...

v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 1 ~ ~ADC had carefully analyzed
voting

a~

patterns and housing patterns and concluded

that the multimember districts in Marion County, Indiana
did have the proscribed effect.

[This case hits close

I

Indianapolis

to home.

I grew up in

MaxiSRX~SHRk~/and

my father was

until 1962.
a legislator from Marion County/] This Court reversed.
It became clear that the Fortson/Burns doctrineJksxaexea

~~~.,..~)
ie£xxxkexassxxs~eRxksxaxfiR«iRg~bordered

a

x•m r

on saying that

m»& group's voting power was cancelled or minimized

if its candidate lost.
The Court elaborated on the/Ytest and narrowed
ftsubstantially.
it was

First it put to one side cases where

~x~&Rxkkakx

shown that multimember districts

"were conceived or operated as purposeful devices to
further racial or economic discrimination."
~H

-

Id. at 149.

Absent such a showing, plaintiffs would hwe to prove

a good deal more about past deprivations in the voting
xkaxxxkHxaiiegeaiJxaixaaxaRkage«x«laxxxka«xkeeR

10
area.

~s
The

~

is

the crucial passageJ:

~ ~:

Nor docs the fact that the number of ghetto residents
who were legislators was not in proportion to ghetto population satisfactorily prove invidious discrimination
absent evidence and findings that ghetto residents had_
less opportunity than did other Marion County residents
to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice. We have discovered nothing in
the record or in the court's findings indicating that poor
Negroes were f!Ot allowed to register or vote, to choose
the political party they desired to support, to participate
inTts affairs or to be equally represented on those occasions when legislative candidates were chosen. Nor did
the evidence purport to show or the court hnd that
inhabitants of the ghetto were regularly excluded from
the slates of both major parties, thus deriying them the
chance of occupying legislative seats..,_,

:JJ . ~
~

~The

1119. -~ ( f;~

Court continued, disowning some of the possible

implications of the earlier cases:
this case, the failure of the
ghetto to have legislative scats in proportion to its popul tion emerges more as a functwn of losing elections
t~n o
uilt-in 1as against poor Negroes. T e voting
power of gh etto residents may h ave been "cancelled out"
as the District Court held, but this seems a mere
euphemism for political defeat at the polls.
On the record before us plaintiffs' position comes to
this: that although they have equal _opportunity to _participate in and influence the selection of candidates and
leg!slfLtors, and although the ghetto votes predominantly
Democratic and that party slates candidates satisfactory
to the ghetto, invidious discrimination nevertheless results when the ghetto, along with all other Democrats,
suffers the disaster of losing too many elections. But
typical American legislative elections are district-oriented,
head-on races between candidates of two or more parties.
As our system has it, one candidate wins, the others
lose. Arguably the losing candidates' supporters are ~
without representation since the men they voted for have
been defeated; arguably they have been denied equal
protection of the laws since they have no legislative voice
of their own. This is true of both single-member and
multi-member districts. But we have not yet deemed it
a denial of equal protection to deny legislative seats to
losing candidates, even in those so-called "safe" districts
where the same party wins year after year.
lt this IS the proper view of

. The mere fact
that one interest group or another concerned wit~ the
outcome of Marion County elections has found Itself
outvoted and without legislative sea~s o_f its own p~o
vides no basis for invoking co~1stltutwnal_ remedies
where, as here, there is no indicatiOn that this se ~~t
of the population is being denied access to the poht~ ~~

Id!l.,d ISL/ -; ...

-

'~'--1$1,
'.Mr

s~-.:,CL~
sa 7 ,Jssues arose in White/. Regester, 412
7

that multimember districts are not per se invalid, but
that
\lA~/
1the Court~ entertained claims that such districts
were used invidiously to cancel out or minimize the
voting strength of racial groups.

It restated the tests:

'
~

/
ry

To sustam
such claims, it is not enough that the racial group allegemy 01scnminated against has not had legislative seats
in proportion to its voting potential. The plaintiffs' b~r
den is to produce evidence to support findmgs that the
·Poiitical processes leading to nomination and election
were not equally open to participation by the group in
question==-that its members had less opportunity than
did other residents in the district to participate in the
political processes and to elect legislators of their choice.

Id. at 765-66.

---

For constitutional cases, these remain the tests.
Indeed, where the claim is that single-member districts
are invalid, the tests must be, if

~

anyth~ng,

more stringen5

~~

~Ain such cases the reviewing court has no alternative
plan to offerlthat is a as easily managed as one

sj._,,,

substitutipJ single,member districts for multimember

13
districts.
In the case before us, I do not see any
possibility that petitioners can prevail under such
a test.
...,

It is not conceivable that it could be proved

't

that white voters have had less opportunity than others
to participate in the political processes and to elect
legislators of their choice.

(I am assuming here that

petitioners' only relevant claim is as white voters, not
as Hasidim.

~XE

They seem to have abandoned the claim

based on standing as Hasidim, and irleeed they would have
had a hard time sustaining it since what they want is

•

-

color-blind and "ethnic-blind" districting.)1l---+-H-

Petitioners' only hope under Chavis xis to

\

-

~

br_i _n_g_ t_h_e_ c_a_s_e_ u_n_d_e_r_ t_h_e_ f_ i _r _s _t _b_r_a_n_ch of{ @.avis '
, t::fie test:: f'l:le to one siae in that:: eas::z

tes t.;:r'

That is, they

would have to show that the districts here "were conceivecA
or operated

a~urposeful

economic discrimination."

devices to further racial or
403 U.S., at 149.

They have

succeeded, I think, in proving that the districts were
drawn pnrposefully with respect to the racial element,
---..,

14
the districts
but they have not shown that/tk.e~ were meant "to
further racial or economd:c discrimination."

There was

no showing that the legislators wanted to harm whites,
part of
if that is/what is meant by the test.

But more

i~axkaREi~

importantly, the Kings County redistricting, viewed as
INMte..

~ e.~Pc.c.t ~~o(' -ft:, ~-k...

a whole) cannot be said to kerm

\(Okfr.

wltits@S•

Even if one

for the moment racial
"! k~;~e.. . ~ -.-...br~):J
assumes/bloc voting (an assumption . . whic~I ' 1 )9
whites have

x~lia

even though they

majorities in 68-70% of the districts
K~XR~k

comprise only about 65% oLthe

31See

Kings County population.

CA2's opinion at n. 21,

Petn. at 27a. ----------------------~~

24,
it a

number of
in nonwhite
e pattern of
formed the basis
The 1974

15
The only way to think that there has been a harmful

~t

on white

~ers

is to focus attention only

on those whites who now find themselves in the districts
deliberately engineered to have 65%-r:onwhites.
is too narrow a focus.

That

" ' should be
The J.{whole county

considered. In that light, I do not think one can say
amounted to a "purposeful device to fut:ther racia
that the districting

fHXKRRXX~fHXKHXRX~fHXKR&Xfeatxxa~iai

• . . discrimination" against whites.

With this background in mind, let me turn to
the three specific questions raised by petitioners.
If I am right that Chavis sets the standards here, then
the questions (as well as the lower court opinion) are
~
~ -tL.. (~ ~
a bit off the mark. ~"-act as though t'
1
al

r+'.q

Swann/ Milliken questions are the crucial ones--as
though race is a permissible

~xixexi~R

consideration

only when used in a aarefully circumscribed way to
remedy a past wrong clearly established.

..,..,..A.., l...t..

~~perfectly

That test

it

sound for most contexts, but, fo]the

reasons outlined above--especially the impossibility
of eradicating race consciousness from the districitng
process--it will not work in the reapportionment area.
The Court should stick with Chavis.

16
As

i!is

the terms in which it presents itself, I
still would hold for respondents.
petitioner's arguments

l..Ee. s-z J

seriatim, as they are set forth at ~~g~xi~f your
~.

aid- to-memory/\ ec l!'wiil''

aptat.E:btgx~~.E::k.E:~~x~x

to
ng
o

race

not

1.

Petitioners argue that there is never any

justification for race-consciousness in the electoral
process.
able,

I have argued above that it is largely unavoid-

seYimsggzzlliiMw:tlftlift:H!!IItirlK551RI

unless the lines are

drawn by friili:tiaalxxna judges or special masters.

The

more important question is whether such oonsciousness
r

~-------------------~----

is invidious, and I think it is the

#x~kaxix g~iiiaR

tv-<> re. ~-t--{'; ~
Chavis test (or some~variant adjusted to apply to a plan

17
that already provides for simgle-member districts) which
forms the standard for judging

invidiousness~

There

was no invidious race-consciousness here.
Moreover, I think the Court should scrutinize
very carefully the basic premise upon which petitillners
build their entire case, even though it has never been
squarely challenged by any of the other parties.

The

petitioners argue that this case is different from
all others ever to come before the Court in that this
is "the first case in which there is absolutely no
factual dispute as to the legislature's dominant purpose
or motive."

I simply cannot agree.

aimBKXXHRxixei~x~Rxxkexxexxim~RJX~f

the New York legislature was not

It is clear that

~-. . . .·?ij~acting

"I-t

of its

WtlS

own free will in drawing the 1974 lines. A 'FAsa¥ uere
acting to oveccome the AG's objections to the 1972 lines.
MoreoverJthe legislative reports indicate that the
legislature did not agree with the AG that the 1972 lines
had a proscribed effect.

But petitioners rely on the

testimony of one individual and one individual alone
as the basis for their assertion that this case "involves
a blatant instance of an overriding racial quota."

Reply

18
Brief at 7.

The individual is Richard Scolaro, executive

director of the legislative committee on reapportionment.
He is apparently not a legislator. He did testify that
the "sole reason" why he ran a district line through

--

the Hasidic community was his understanding that the AG
wanted a given number of 65% nonwhite districts.
This
.. Court, however, should not let one staff

-

member's testimony determine conclusively the intent
of the entire legislature of the sovereign state of
New York.
Inquirees into congressional motives or
purposes are a hazardous matter. . ••
What motivates one legislator ~x to make
a speech about a statute is not necessarily
what motivates scores of others to enact it,
and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to
eschew guesswork.,.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-384.
See also Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-225.
The unique setting of this case, wheee New York is
fOSI+ltMJ

basically sympathetic to petitioners"~srr 4 has meant

.3'o~

~.Jos~

that New York has not~raised anyA?bjection to the Gout's
presuming intent from isolated remarks by staff members.
presumed
But this does not make a/finding of legislative intent
any the less a monumental undertaking for this Court.

We~es

•s

~en though Scolaro may have been xkux motivated

solely by the AG's ostensible 65% requirement, I cannot
believe that all the ~egislator~ who voted for the
all

plan likewise

abandonedxaR~/other

when they cast their votes.

considerations

Surely they reviewed the

lines to make sure that they did not trench too deeply

on other interests the legislature wanted to serve.
And since the 1974 lines rs? 71 Y are not too terribly
different generally from the 1972 lines, I should think
that whatever motives prompted adoption of the 1972
lines also went into approval of the 1974 lines.
other words, it is

xxgx~x

In

an oversimplification, even

in the unusual circumstances of this case, to say that
a 65% quota was the legislature's gnly motive in
adopting the 1974 plan.

2. Petitioners argue that even if race consciousness is sometimes permissible, it must be done only
upon a solid administrative or judicial finding of a
past wrong.

They claim that the jH AG's objection

cannot serve as such a finding, because kaxxxaxaax~Rl~
~' b~J·ec:..-H~ I4'4S so ~l..tl
\\r.-&-te{. :r"'

~ lt..."f+e~r ~\M

...,.~; use sue'R a Hlila s l!a• •• aafiii,

j'ne AG pointed x~xxka
whether the plan

the
has

axaix£ximiaax~x~Afurpose

or effect of abridging

the right to vote because of race or color.
stated:

Then he

"we have concluded that the proscribed effect

may exist in parts of the plans in Kings and New york
counties~

(emphasis added).

That is not a very ringing declaration of a
past wrong.

But in context I think it has k to be

taken as an administrative finding that calls for
remedial action.

I would not tax the AG too heavily

for his namby-pamby wording.

-

states, 411

U.S~526,

After Georgia v. United

this is all he has to say in

order to explain his objection.
~o:s:ttieii;

tiPII'

~i

ift a delieal!e q

'(I %1e!'e fzzltls posttiort, I

tge

n"'ii'6

;+

-l,

. ....'*

_

-

=·

lila

u

There is no need to call New

-il

efC~f,
York official~Aa bunch of racists, even

;"

"Jil P d

7

a g ih g e ' a s k

1972 plan

I@Al~

and effect.

*

n;a

lav\

1

'

1 .•?_.l_.]~i•rL
i~~~s~cm;._

:.-:~~~lit~t

the

was horribly discriminatory in purpose

He has to deal with the officials in other

contexts, so he has every incentive to use the mildest
language possible.

22

his determination is
final

Rights Act

Baxi~all~

provides for"review"(really a de novo action concerning
the same questions) only in the district court for the
District of C~lumbia.

Only the state can invoke that

review, and it chose not

~o

do so.

That

iX&XXftH&8RX

decision was ostensibly prompted more by time pressures
than by acquiescence in the AG's finding (although here
too there is room for skepticism as to the real motivation ) does not make the AG's objection any the less final.
Even if the odds are low that the AG's action would have
been sustained upon a proper challenge--and I do not
concede thatJl -the fact remains that it was not challenged.

-

We must, I think, treat it as a fully valid finding

-

.....

of racial dis crimination.

Petitioners have largely forsworn their claim that
the present suit is an appropriate forum

for~eviewing

the AG's decision, but their reply brief at 5 n.l demonstrates
that they are not quite giving up.

To the extent that

this remains a live issue, the Court should affirm the
DC's and c*'s judgment dismissing the suit against the
AG, and make clear that this case is not appropriate
for reviewing the AG's objection or the standards he
employed.

The sole question here, unless this Court's

Voting Rights Act cases are to be drastically reconsidered,
is whether the 1974 lines violate the constitutional
rights of white voters .X

If tr plit

t

tz foi~ '2. (~\.1\S

relevant (and my Chavis analysis suggests it really is
not), then we do

have~a

solid, final, cureently

nonrevi~-

-

able administrative finding of a constitutional wrong

·-

to be corrected.

3.

Petit.oners' narrowest argument, tracking

Judge Frankel, is that even if there was a finding of

~rong,

nothing in the finding justifies the

exxxaaKHiRg~

extraordinary remedy of a rigid 65% nonwhite quot ••
Wt. ~ l.c-of.c ~ ~ ~
Again I think the focus is too narrow.

~~~s.
~applied only to
districts.

~Senate

districts and two assembly

9xkexx Other districts varied

in percentages.

t

axamaxi~all¥

This is not a school case, and again

;$ ~+ ~~--

I .de ftee ehiiK wann/Milliken treatment ,_e:tJ to evel!y
,~-~ ....,;t
~ fD every ~I ,~ e.vu ;l.'.rfric;f lik.l...
1
• asp as b a£ tho pI ah 19 app1 OfJPikatg. In the reapportionment
context>the kind of numbers game played here, given
the AG's unchallenged objection, was not unacceptable.

...
•

~.Justice

Harlan wrote a x~ea separate opinion

~'1.

'"'"
I.
H8kiHgxxkaxA He noted thepl ·

hR&t

-ilfti:Be

11

'evident

malaise among the members of the Court' with prior

•
decisions in the fieMd of voter qualifiCations and
'(o 3

reapportionment.

11
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s

I &r:"

"-,A He went on:

The reapportionment • opinions of this court
provide little help. They speak in conclusory
terms of 'debasement' or 'dilution' of the 'voting
power' or 'representation' of citizens without explanation of what these concepts are. • . .
A coherent and ~listie notion of what is
meant by 'voting power' might have restrained
some of the extreme lengths to which this Court
has gone in pursuit of the will-o'-the-wisp
of 'one man, one vote.'
He hit the heart of the problem.

But unfortunately he

did not go on to axxi£Hia.Kexax£ixxsw suggest what a
coherent concept of voting power would be.
caught in the problem.

We Hre still

f2

[-f'o~~ 1 1 cnd~]_
I think the Court made a mistake iR years ago
applying
~
in xxaR.s:iaxiRg the "dilution" conceptjfx8mxxkexRx to
the voting power of groups within districts of equal
population.

Dilution is a fairty clear concept when

applied to individuals in districts of markedly differant

i' A-v~fot/.e!
population, for there _,a clear base-line referen7\

;t-

one person, one vote.

_.~is

When

applied to groups,

the concept becomes hopelessly fuzzy.
clear baseline.

~

There is no

Any number of configurations of

\district lines coul~ be drawn, with different implications
for group "effectiveness."
effectiveness?

Does concentration enhance

Or are certain

kinds~f

diffusion, wheeeby

the group becomes the swing vote, the best?

Moreover,

although nobody wants any group to be totally without
effectiveness, it is not

clea~ust

what level of effective-

ness constitutes anyone's due.
In an attempt to give the dilution concept some
clear content (i.e., .K8xaefiRexaiiuxeax diluted in
comparison to what?), some courts have come close to
saying either that black voting power must be maximized,
or that some kind of proportional representation must
be guaranteed:

blacks are to have a clear majority in

a percentage of districts equivalent to their population
percentage.

If one enters the'Uilution" quagmire, then

perhaps such standards affortl the only solid ground--the
only baseline--available.

But they require one to assume

that race (or race-related issues) will always be the
determinative factor when individuals decide for whom
to vote--a grotesque assumption.
Court should reconsider

Perhaps some day this
,.

-f3

..

the application of the dilution concept to groups affected

~~ s~ ~ff'(i~6"\
by reapportionment.

Jltl&AVD uld confine constitutional

policing to cases as extreme as

Gomillion,~peraaps

retaining review of multimember districts (a narrowly
circumscribed phenomenon) under the Chavis standards.
And of course, reasonable population equivalency should

See note 3 infra.

2.

In this respect, the plan

co~

conceivably

be sustained under the following language from Gaffney:
'

But neither we nor the district courts have a constitutional warrant to invalidate a state plan, otherwise within
' tolerable population limits, because it undertakes, not to
minimize or eliminate the political strength of any group
, or party, bu,t to recognize it and, through districting, provide a rough sort of proportional representation in the
I
-legislative halls of the State.

Hswexex~

I would not, however, rely on this notion in

owr ,-~.e~

Fair,
......,\context. A ('roportional representation of par'ties

is~ a mild proposition; of races, muc~ore problematic.

f4
3.

The 1972 district lines did at least raise

some substantial question about the legislative
motivation.

See the map in the NAACP brief, p. 23.

When the AG is working with a concept as amorphous
as "dilution of group voting power," it seems quite
possible that burden of proof will make a big difference.
That is, in constitutional cases where the burden is
on the plaintiffs, "fishy" configurations like the
1972 lines will usually be sustained.

Under the Voting

it is conceivable that
Rights Act, with the burden on the state,/"fishy"
configurations will often fail, even if the substantive
standard remains the same.
I think, parenthetically, that it would have
better if reapportionment had never been held to

q

the practices or procedures required to be
submitted for review under §5 of the Voting Rights Act.

L :s~ u~ ~4-.,~J

This Court)• een~tl!MiH~ tsb:g ~et in Allen v. Board of

It ~~~~-to

:\'h-..~ of.o .., ~

arguable
history.

iRxex~xexaxiaR

-+..A .sk:t-1-~
vo of.i

reading of the legislative

At the cited page, the Court pulled in the

Reynolds v. Sims "dilution" language and applied xi it
to group voting power, without any recognition of the

~'S se.J, '(t •

analytical difficulties involved.

Mr. Justice Harlan, t\

f5

• '"' ~ -t1eA1,
~~~Y:~ii'~§~·,~~.

had the better of the

argument\~in

showing

that Congress did not intend the 1965 Act to apply
to reapportionment or changes from _... district to
at-large voting.

But he went unheeded.
It is

xfxxkixxiRXHX~XHkaxi~RXiKXX~XBHXXHX

iHxex~xeaxxio

probably too late to turn around that act of
statutory construction.

For one thing, Congress has

reenacted the Act twice since Allen, fully embracing
the implications of Allen.
in this Court

a££H~xea

even more deeply.

Moreover, subsequent cases

entrenched the interpretation

Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379

(annexations); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526
(reapportionment).

And even the cases from the last

decidedly
two terms are still/speaking the language of .. "dilution"
and "effectiveness" of a group's voting power.
of Kichmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358;

Cit¥

B~

v. United States, No. 73-1869 (March 30, 1976).
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MR.

delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits a state or
politic~J subdivision subject to § 4 of the Ac,t from implementin~ a l~gishttive reapportionment unless it h~ obtained
··a declaratory judgmept from the District Court for the Dis!trict of Columbia, or a ruling from ·the Attorney General
of the Upited States, that the reapportionment "does not
'have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying
'Or abridgipg the right to vote on .account of race or oolor...•" 1

'

JusTICE WHITE

1 ~ection

~ "': 1C •~

t::A-.t:i:,J A• ...(

l'1t,

-..:4

,

~--··~4(

5 of the Voting Rights Act, ~2 U. S. C. § 1973c, provides in ! '
·pertment part:
~--C.~I ~
1
'Whenever .•. a State or political subdivision with respect to which J
.
'the prohibitions set forth in sectjon 1973b (a) ,of this title based upon ,.,.. 4.,C ~
determinations made under the second sentence 'Of section 197ab (b) of ~
•
thi~ title are in e~~ct shall e~act or ~eek to adminis~er any voting qual!fi- - , "-I'~
catlon or prereqmstte 10 votmg, or standard, practice, or procedure w1th
respect to vot$g different from that in force or effect on November 1,
1008, ... such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia for a. declaratory
judgment that such qualification , prerequisite, standard, pract.ice, or pro~
cedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying
or abridginf!l the right to vote on 1\Ccount of race or color, and unless and
until the cQurt enters sue}} judgment no person sha.ll be denied the right
to vote for failure to comply 'with such qualification, IJrerequisite, stand-

,

J

I!
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UNITED JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS v. CAREY

. The question presented is whether, in the circumstances of
this case, the use of racial criteria by the State of New York
in its attempt to comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights
'Act and to secure the approval of the Attorney General
violated the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments.

I
Kings County, N. Y., together with New York (Manhattan) and Bronx Counties, became subject to §§ 4 and 5
of the Act, by virtue of a determination by the Attorney
General that a literacy test was used in these three counties
as of November 1, 1968, and a determination by the Director
of the Census that fewer than 50% of the voting-age residents
of these three counties voted in the presidential election of
1968. 2 Litigation to secure exemption from the Act was
unsuccessfuV and it became necessary for New York to
ard, practice, or procedure: Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite,
standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced without. such proceeding
if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has
been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of
such State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney
General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such
submission, except that neither the Attorney General's failure to object
nor a declaratory judgment entered under this section shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such qua.Ji.fication, prerequisite,
standard, practice, or procedure. Any act-ion under this section shall be
heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with
the provisions of section 2284 of Title 28 and any appeal shftll lie to
the Supreme Court."
A legislative reapportionment is a "standard, practice, or procedure with
respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1,
1968," within the meanh1g of § 5. Beer v. United States, 44 U. S. L. W.
4435, 4436 (1976); Georgia v. United States, 411 U . S. 526 (1973) ;
Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 569 (1969) .
~See 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (b) .
3 The State of New York brought an action to obtain a statutory
exemption for the three counties under § 4 (a) of the Act, seekmg a
.declaratory jud~ment that its literacy te~t had not been \!Sed within the

'

.

r
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secure the approval of the Attorney General or of the United
S'tates District Court for the District of Columbia for its
1972 reapportionment statute insofar as that statute concerned Kings, New York, and Bronx Counties. On January 31, 1974, the provisions of the statute districting these
counties for congressional, state senate, and state assembly
seats were submitted to the Attorney General. In accordance with the regulations governing his § 5 review, the Attorney General considered submissions from interested parties
criticizing and defending the plan.• Those submissions included assertions that voting in these counties was racially
10 years preceding the filing of the suit "for the purpo::;e or with the
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color." 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (a). After several years of litigation, the
District Court for the District of Columbia denied the exemption and
ordered the State to comply with the filing requirements of § 5. This
Court summarily affirmed. New York on Behalf of New York Co·unty v.
United States, 419 U.S. 888 (1974). See 510 F. 2d, at 516.
4 Section 51.19, 28 C. F. R. provides:
"Section 5, in providing for submission to the AttornPy General as a.n
alternative to seeking a declaratory judgment from the U. S. District.
Court for the District of Columbia, imposes on the Attorney General
what is essentially a judiCial function. Therefore, the burden of proof on
the submitting authority is the same in submitting changes to the Attorney General as it. would be in submitting changes to the District Court
for the District of Columbia, The Attorney General shall base his decision
on a review of material presented by the submitting authority, relevant
information providffi by individuals or groups, and the results of any
investigation conducted by the Department of Justice. If the Attorney
General is satisfied that the submitted change does not have a racially
discriminatory purpose ot· effect, he will not object to the change and will
so notify the .submitting authority. If the At.torney General determines
th.a t the submitted changE' has a racially discrimina.tory purpose or effect.
he will enter an objectiOn and will so notify the submitting authority .
If the evidence as to the purpose or effect of the change is conflicting,
and the Attorney GE-neral is unable to re:solve the conflict. within the
60-day period, he iihall , consistent with the abovt>-describt>d burdt>n of
proof applicable in the District Court, entPr an objection and so notify
the submitting authority."

l
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polarized and that the district lines had been created with
the purpose or effect of diluting the voting strength of
nonwhites (blacks and Puerto Ricans) ;5 On April 1. 1974,
the Attorney General concluded that, as to certain districts
in Kings County covering the Bedford-Stuyvesant area of
Brooklyn, the State had not met the burden placed on it
by § 5 and the regulations thereunder to demonstrate that
the redistricting had neither the purpose nor the effect of
abridging the right to vote by reason of race or color. 6
Under § 5, the State could have challenged the Attorney
General's objections to the redistricting plan by filing a
The record in this Court contains only part of the materials submittro
to and considered by the Attorney General in his review of the 1972 plan .
Included in the present. record are a memorandum submitted on behalf
of the NAACP and letters from sPveral prominent black and Puerto
Rican elected officials, all opposing the plan. Not included in the record
are materiaJs defending the plan submitted by the reapportionment committee of the New York legislature, the state attornpy genPral, and several state legislators. Brief for the United States, at 8, and n. 9.
The NAACP, the Attorney GPneral, and the court bPlow classified
Puerto Ricans in New York together with blacks as a minority group
entitled to the protections of the Voting Rights Act. Hereinafte r WE'
use the term "nonwhite" to refer to blacks and Puerto Ricans , although
small numbers of other nonwhite groups (such as orientals) are also
included in the nonwhite population statistics.
u The basis for the Attorney General's conclusion that. "the proscribed
effect may exist" as to certain state assembly and senate districts in Kings
County was explained in his letter to the New York state authoritie- as
follows :
"Senate district 18 appears to have an abnormally high minority concentration while adjoining minority neighborhoods are significantly diffused into surrounding districts. In the less populous proposed assembly
districts, the minority population appears to be concentrated into districts 53, 54, 55 and 56, while minority neighborhoods adjoining those
districts are diffused into a number of other districts. . . . [W]e know
of no necessity for such configuration and believe other rational alternatives exist."
The Attorney General also objected to the congressional districting in
Kings County and to the statE' legislativE' districting in New York County,
The districting for these ·eat ~ is n9t at iss11e in this litigation,
5

. ;
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declaratory judgment action in a three-judge court in the
District of Columbia. Instead, the State sought to meet
what it understood to be the Attorney General's objections
and to secure his approval in order that the 1974 primary
and general elections could go forward under the 1972
statute. 7 A revised plan, submitted to the Attorney General
on May 31, 1974, in its essentials did not change the number
of districts with nonwhite majorities but did increase the
size of the nonwhite majorities in those districts. Under the
1972 plan, Kings County had three sta.te senate districts
with nonwhite majorities of approximately 91 ro, 61%, and
53%; un~~~r~vi_s~lan, but theJ:e w~e~ain t~e
districts with nonwlllte majorities, but now all three were
between 0% and 75% nonwhite. 8 As for state assembly
districts, both the 1972 and the 1974 plans provided for
seven districts with nonwhite majorities. However, under
the 1972 plan, there were four between 85ro and 95% nonwhite, and three were approximately 76ro, 61%, and 52% ,
respectively; under the 1974 plan, the two smallest nonwhite
majorities were increased to 65% 1¥1d 67.5%, and the two

1

I

7 The State was also under pressure from a private suit to compel
enactment of new district lines consistent with the views of the Attorney
General. NAACP v. New York City Board of Electiom, SDNY 72 Civ.
1460. See 510 F. 2d, at 517 n. 6.
8 The 1972 percentages are taken from Table 3, accompanying the
memorandum in support of the motions to dismiss of the applicants for
intervention, record at 265, except for the 61% figure, which is for a
dist.rict only partially in Kings County. That figure is taken from the
Brief for the United States, App., at 53, and represents the black and
}>uerto Rican population rather than all nonwhites. The 1974 percentages arc taken from the Interim Report of the Joint Committee on
Reapportionment, record at. 179-180. (The "record" is the printed
appendix submitted by the parties.)
The 1974 plan created nonwhite majorities in two state senate districts
that were majority white under the 1972 plan (the 17th anji the 23d),
but created white majorities in two districts that were IIUljority nonwhite
under the 1972 plan (the 16th and the 25th). See Brief for the United
States, App ., at 53.
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in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioners also
fl,lleged that they were assigned to electoral districts solely
on the basis of race, and that this racial assignment diluted
their voting power in viohttion of the Fifteenth Amendment.
Petitioners sought an injunction restraining New York officials from enforcing the new redistricting plan and a declaratory judgment that the Attorney General of the United
States had used unconstitutional and improper standards in
objecting to the 1972 plan.
On June 20, 1974, the District Court held a hea.ring on
petitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction. On July 1,
1974, the f\.ttorney General informed the State of New York
that he did not object to the implementation of the revised
plan. The Attorney General moved to be dismissed as a
party on the ground th~t the relief sought agajnst him could
be obtained only in the District Court for the District of
Columbia and· only by a State or political subdivision subject
to the Voting Rights Act; the State and the intervenor
NAACP moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The District Court granted the motions to dismiss the complaint, reasoning that petitioners enjoyed no constitutional
right in reapportionment to separate
community recogntion
I
as Hasidic Jews, that the redistricting did not disenfranchise
petitioners, and that racial considera.tions were permissible
to correct past disorimination.12 377 F. Supp., at 1165-1166.
A divided Court of Appeals affirmed. The majority first
held that the Attorney General must be dismissed as a party
because the court had no jurisdiction to review his objection
to the 1972 plan :18 After agreeing with the District Court
Petitioners' motions for a preliminary injunction and summary judgment were ' denied .
18 Although petitioners did not present this que!ltion for review, they
argue that the Attorney General is properly a party to this suit because
he allegedly c~tused the st.ate uffic1als to deprive petitioners of their constitutional rights. Brief for P eti6oner:;) at 53-54, n. 22; Petjtioners' Reply
12

I

:'
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that petitioners had no constitutional right to separate com~
munity recognition in reapportionment-a holding not challenged by petitioners here 14-the Court of Appeals went on
to address petitioners' claims as white voters that the 1974
plan denied them equal protectio11 of the laws and abridged
their right to vote on the basis of race. The court noted
that the 1974 plan left approximately 70%- of the senate and
assembly districts in Kings County with white majorities;
given that only 65ro of the population of the county was
white, the 1974 plan would not underrepresent the white
population, assuming that voting followed racial lines. 510
F. 2d., at 523, and n. 21. Petitioners thus could not claim
that the plan canceled out the voting strength of whites
as a racial group, under this Court's decisions in White
v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (19'73), and Whitcomb v. Chavis,
403 U. S. 124 (1971). The court then observed that the
case did not present the question whether a legislature,
"starting afresh," could draw lines on a racial basis so as to
bolster nonwhite voting strength, but rather the "narrower"
question whether a State could use racial considerations in
drawing lines in an effort to secure the Attorney General's
approval under the Voting Rights Act. 510 F. 2d, at 524. The
court thought this question answered by this Court's decision
in Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544,569 (1969),
where a change from district to at-large voting for county
supervisors was held to be covered by ~ 5 of the Act. The
court below reasoned that the Act contemplated that the
Attorney General and the state legislature would have "to
Brief, at. 5 n. I. In view of our disposition of the case, we do not reach

this issue.
14 In their brief in this Court, petitioners state: "[We do not] conten<l
that there is any right-constitutional or statutory-for permanent recognition of a community in legislative apportionment. Our argument is,
rather, that the history of the area demonstrates that there could b~
and in fact was-no reason other than race to divide the community at
~his time." Brief for Petitioners, il.t 6 n . 6. (Emphasis in original.)

I
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think in racial terms"; because the Act "necessarily deals
with race or color, corrective action under it must do the
same." (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted ..) The
court held that
"so long as a districting, even though based on racial
considerations, is in conformity with the unchallenged
directive of and has the approval of the Attorney General of the United States under the Act, at least absent
a clear showing that the resultant legislative reapportionment is unfairly prejudicial to white or nonwhite,
that districting is not subject to challenge." 510 F. 2d,
at 525.15
We granted certiorari, 423 U. S. 945 (1975). We affirm.
II

Petitioners argue that the New York Legislature, under
the compulsion of the Attorney General, has violated the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments by deliberately revising its reapportionment plan along racial lines. They argue
that whatever might be true in other contexts, the use of
racial criteria in apportionment and districting is never permissible and that, in any event, there is no finding of past
discrimination the residual effects of which require or justify
as a remedy that white voters be reassigend in order to
increase the size of black majorities in certain districts. Our
difficulty with this argument is that it fails to appreciate
Js The dissent. would have found a constitutional violation in "the
drawing of district lines with a central and governing premise that a set
number of districts must have a predetermined nonwhite majority of
65% or more in order to ensure nonwhite control in those districts." The
dissent pointf'd out that neither the Attorney General nor the State of
New York would take responsibility for the 65% "quota ," and argued
that there was no showing of i~ pre-existing wrong which could justify the
use of a "presumptively odious" racial classifieation . 510 F . 2d, at. 525.
52& (Frankel, J.).
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the role of the Voting Rights Act in this case.1 " This is not
81 case, as petitiOll'ers w:o~ld have 1t, of '7tffirmative action"
or "benign discrimination"; nor is it even a case of "remedial"
discrimin~ttion designed to eliminate the effects of past discrimination. It is rather a case involving the applicf.\,tion
of the screening procedures of the Voting Rights Act to
ensure that a change in voting procedures-here a new reapportionment statute-does not qiscriminate against racial
minorities. The Attorney General's objection to tpe 1972
plan and New York's consequent changes in that plan were
aimed at ensuring that discriminatory voting laws would not
be implemented in the first place, not at curing the effects of
past discrimination.
In upholding the Voting Rights Act as a valid exercise
of congressional authority under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, we recognized the ineffectiveness of case-by-case litig~t
tion in combating "widespread and persistent" voting discrimination and the need for "sterner and more elaborate
measures" to countera.ot the "unre:rnit!Jng and ~ous )~
d,dian~e _o{_the Constitution." "SSuth Carolina V: Ka z:;nbach, 383 U:~ "Smr,"~8 (1966). One of the "stringent
~
new remedie$" we upheld was the screening by federal au~ . J _
thorities req'\}ired by § 5 before States subject to the Act
- ~ -'1 ~
were permitted to implement new voting regulations. RecJ ~ _ . ._
ognizing § 5 as "an uncommon exercise of congressional
~- ·
~~
power" which might not be appropriate in less exceptional
circumstances, we sustained it nonetheless, as a "permissibly
W. 1~ _ . _
decisive" response to 11 the extraordinary strategem of con..(...... ~

1

111
The United States and the Stat<' of New York have urged us to hold
that. wholly aside from the Voting Rights Act it is constitutionally permissible for a legislature to draw district lines deliberately in such a way
as to achieve a proportion of majority white and of majority nonwhite
districts roughly approximating the proportion of each racial group in the
countywide population.
Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 751-754 (1973), but we do not need
to reach it because we dispose of this case on 11- narrower P"round.
(?

~
J

.

U. ,
~r~
.~
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triving new rules of various kinds for the sole purpose of
perpetuating voting discrimillation in the face of adverse
federal court decrees." ld., at 334-335. (Footnote omitted.)
In Allen v. State Board of Elections, supra, on which the
Court of Appeals relied below, we held that a change from
district to at-large voting for county supervisors had to be
submitted for federal approval under § 5, because of the
potential for a "dilution'' of minority voting power which
could "nullify their ability to elect the candidate of their
choice . . . . " /d., at 569. When it renewed the Voting
Rights Act in 1970 and again in 1975, Congress was well aware
of the application of § 5 to redistricting. In its 1970 extension, Congress relied on findings by the United States
Commission on Civil Rights that the newly g~ned voting
strength of minorities was in danger of being diluted by
redistricting plans that divided minority communities among
predominantly white districts.17 In 1975, Congress was unThe findings of the Commission's 18-month study, contained in its
1968 report, Political Participation, at 21-39, were endorsed in a statement submitted in the course of the Senate debates by ten out of seventeen Senate Judiciary Committee members, who proposed and successfully supported the critical amendment that extended § 5. The findings
were repeatedly referred to during tne Senate and House he.o1.rings held
in 1969 and 1970 in connection with the extension. E. g., Hearings on
H. R. 4249, H. R. 5538, and Simihr Proposals (Voting Rights Act. Extension) before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 3-4 (1969) (statement of Rep. McCulloch); id., at 17 (testimony of Howard Glickstein, Acting Staff Director, United States Commission on Civil Rights); id., at 150 (testimony
of Thomas E. Harris, Associate General Counsel, AFL-CIO); Hearin~
on S. 818, S. 2456, etc. (Amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965)
before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., 47 (1969) (testimony of Frankie Freeman, Member, United States Commission on Civil
Rights); id., at 132 (testimony of .Joseph L. Raub, Jr., General Counsel,
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights); id., at 427 (statement of Howard
Glickstein); id., at 516-518 (testimony of David Norman, Deputy Assist~
:ant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U. S. Dept.. of Justice.
17
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mistakenly cognizant of this new phase in the effort to
eliminate voting discrimination. Former Attorney General
Katzenbach testified tha.t ~ 5 "has had its broadest impact . . . in the areas of redistricting and reapportionment,"
and the Senate and House reports recommending the extension of the Act referred specifically to the Attorney General's role in screening redistricting plans to protect the opportunities for nonwhites to be elected to public office.18
In Beer v. United States, 44 U. S. L. W. 4435 (1976), the
Cou~t considered the question of what criteria a legislative
reapportionment must ~atisfy under § 5 of the Voting Rights
Act to demonstrate t~at it does not have the "effect" of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race.
Beer established that the Voting Rights Act does not permit
the implementation of a reapportionment that "would lead
to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with
respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise."
/d., at 4438. This test requires that, in jurisdictions with
a history of voting by racial blocs, the reapportionment must
not decrease the percentage of districts where members of
racial minorities protected by the Act are in the majority.
See id. Where this requirement is not met, clearance by the
Attorney General or the District Court for the District of
Columbia cannot be given, and the reapportionment cannot
be implemented.
The refl,pportionment at issue in Beer was approved by
this Court, because New Orleans had created one councilmanic
district with a majority of black voters where none existed
before. But had there been districts with black majorities
under the previous law and had New Orleans in fact decreased the number of majority black districts, it would have
1 8 Hearings before a SubcommittPP of the Senate Judiciary Committeo,
94th Cong., 1st Sess., 124 (1975) (testimony of Nicholas Katzenbach);
S. Rep. No. 94-295, 94th Cong., bt Sess., 15-19 (1975); H. R. Rep . No.
, .. 94-196, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 8-11 (1975).
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had to modify its plan in order to implement its reapportion·
tnent by carving out a large enough black majority in however
inany additional districts would be necessary to satisfy the
Beer test. There was division on the Court as to what a
State must show to satisfy § 5; but all eight Justices who
participated in the decision implicitly accepted the proposition that a State may tevise its reappottionment plan to
comply with § 5 by Increasing the percentage of black voters
in a particular district until it has produced a clear majority.
See 44 U. S. L. W., at 4438; id., at 4439 (WHITE, J., dissenting), 4443-4444 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). lndeed, the plan
eventua.lly approved by this Court in Beer was drawn with
the purpose of avoiding dilution of the blaock vote by attaining at least a 54% majority of black voters in one district
while preventing a 90% concentration. See Beer v. United
'States, record, at 341-342.
The Court has taken a similar approach it~ applying § 5
to the extension of city boundaries througp anpexation.
Where the annexation has the effect of reducing the percentage of blacks in the city, the proscribed "effect" on voting
rights can be avoided by a post-annexa.tion districting plan
which "fairly reflects the strength of the Negro community
as it exists after the annexation)) and whicn "would afford
them representation reasonably equivalent to their political
strength in the enlarged community." City of Richmond
v. United States, 422 U. S. 35&, 310- 371 (1975). Accord,
City of Petersburg V. um:ted States, 354 F. Supp. l021 (DC
1972), aff'd, 410 U. S. 962 (1973). In Cjlu. of R ichmond,
the Court approved a,n annexation which reduced the proportion of blacks in the city fro~ 52%· to 42ro, because the postannexation ward system created four out of nine wards with
substantial black majorities of 64%. H~d the redistricting
failed to "fairly reflect the strength of the Negro community," however, it would follow fro111 the Court's decision
that the Constitution would permit the city to modify it~
0

0
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plan by deliberately creating black majorities in a sufficient
number of wards to satisfy statutory requirements.
Implicit in Beer and City of Richmond, then, is the proposi~
tion that a State subject to the Voting Rights Act may
redistrict along racial lines to purge its reapportionment
plan of a discriminatory effect. That proposition must be
rejected if we are to accept petitioners' view that racial
criteria may be used, if at all. Qnly to eliminate the effects
of a past discrimination in apportionment. However, we
decline to hold that the Voting Rights Act, as construed
by this Court in Beer, is an unconstitutional exercise of con~
gressional authority to implement the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S,
641 (1966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra. Rather,
we hold that this use of racial criteria to shore up the voting
potential of nonwhite voters in a reasonable attempt to
comply with § 5 does not violate the Constitution.
Based on the evidence and submissions before him,' 9 the
Attorney General refused to approve the 1972 plan for
Kings County until the nonwhite majority in certain districts had been sufficiently increased. It was evidently his
judgment that only in this way could a dilution of nonwhite
representation be prevented. Petitioners insist that, because
the Attorney General concluded not that the 1972 plan would
have a discriminatory effect but only that the State had
failed to demonstrate that the plan would not ha.ve such
an effect, there was insufficient justification for racial redistricting. This a.rgument overlooks the central role of the
shift in burden of proof in the congressiona.l effort to combat
discrimina.tory voting laws. As we said in South Carolina
v. Katzenbach, supra, "After enduring nearly a century of
systematic resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress
might well decide to shift the advantage of time and inel.'ti&.
10

SPe nn. 4 and 6, suprq,

l
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from the perpetrators of the evils to the victims." 383 U. S.
at 328. And in affirming the issuance of an injunction
against enforcement of a state reapportionment plan for
which the State had not demonstrated the absence of a discriminatory effect, the Court stated :
"It is well established that in a declaratory judgment
action under § 5, the plaintiff State has the burden
of proof. What the Attorney General's regulations do
is to place the same burden on the submitting party
in a § 5 objection procedure. . . . Any less stringent
measure might well have rendered the formal declara.t ory
judgment procedure a dead letter by making available
to covered States a far smoother path to clearance."
Georgia v. United States, 411 U. S. 526, 538 (1973).
CFootnote omitted.)
Petitioners a.lso overlook the allocation of burden of proof
under § 5 when they suggest that the Attorney General
should have compared the voting power of nonwhites under
the 1972 plan with nonwhite voting power under the previous
reapportionment in 1966, The purden was on the State to
convince the Attorney General that its plan would not ha.ve
the proscribed effect. There is no evidence in the present
record, and no offer of proof by petitioners, to show whether
the 1972 plan increased or decreased the number of nonwhite majority districts in comparison with the 1966
reapportionment.w
Finally, petitioners object to what they describe as an
"irrational" 65 % "quota" imposed· by the Attorney Genera.!.
The Attorney General's letter of obj ection provided reasons
for his inability to approve the 1972 plan, but did not anPetitioners take the position that. there are no disputed issues of
fact and that their motion for s um~a ry judgment. should be granted on
the basis of the present record. Petitioners' Reply .Brief, at 17; T r. of
Oral Arg., at 70-71.
20
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nounce the criteria an acceptable plan would have to meet.
It would have been no more appropriate for the Attorney
General to suggest an alternative plan than it would have
been for the three-judge court in Beer to issue a dictum describing precisely what plan would have enabled New Orleans
to satisfy the court's view of the requirements of the Voting Rights Act. However, the nature of the modification
required was clear from the reasons given for the objection:
lines had to be redrawn to assign some nonwhites in abnormally concentrated nonwhite districts to adjoining districts. Because several of those adjoining districts already
contained nonwhite majorities, the task confronting the legislative reapportionment committee was essentially to create
more substantial nonwhite majorities in districts adjoining
those with high concentrations of nonwhites. The committee had to revise the plan for resubmission in less than
two months in order to conduct the 1974 elections on schedule, and it therefore sought through informal contacts with
Justice Department officials to ascertain exactly what percentages-would guarantee approval for the revised plan. On
the basis of these discussions, the committee concluded that
the Attorney General would view 65% as 11> substantial
majority, and the committee proceeded to modify petitioners'
assembly district to achieve this figure. The overall effect
of the revisions was to smooth out the distribution of nonall whites in Kings County but only about 55% of all nonwhites in nonwhite majority districts. The number of nonwhite majority districts was not increased; but in the 1974
plan there were no nonwhite majorities above 90% and none
below 65% .21
The Attorney General's insistence on increasing the size
of the nonwhite majority in two senate districts and two
assembly districts was within the scope of his empowered
duties and was not inconsistent with the statute. As the
~1

See text at nn . 8 and 9, supra.
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Court indicated in Beer, 44 U. S. L. W., at 4436 n. 4, there
is often a substantial difference between the nonwhite percentage of total population in a district and the nonwhite
percentage of the voting age population. In the redistricting plan approved in Beer, for example, only one of the
two districts with a black population majority also had a
black majority of registered voters. /d., at 4438. Where
the question of the existence of a discriminatory effect focuses
on the opportunity for the election of nonwhite candida.tes,
the percentage of eligible or registered voters by district is of
great importance. 22 No such statistics were furnished to the
Attorney General by the State. The NAACP, intervenor in
this action, submitted census data showing tha.t roughly 75%
of aU whites in Kings County but only about 55% of all nonwhites were eligible to vote ..28 The NAACP urged that districts without significant nonwhite population majorities
would not have nonwhite majorities among eligible voters.~~
2 2 The regulation governing submissions to the Atto111ey General for
review of redistricting plans under § 5 "strongly urges" the submitting
authority to include "[v]oting-age population and the number of registered voters before and after the change, by race, for the area to be
affected by the change." 28 CFR §51.10(b)(6)(ii) (1976).
·23 Table 2, accompanying memoralldum in support of motions to dismiss
of applicants for intervention, record, at 264.
u In its memorandum urging the Attorney General to object to the
1972 plan, the NAACP argued that petitioners' assembly district, which
in the initial figures submitted to the Attorney General was reported as
having a liOn white majorit.y of 50.1% (subsequently revised to 61%),
should be counted as a white majority district because of the difference
in the percentages of whites and nonwhites eligible to vote. Record,
at 219.
The statistical problems in estimating the nonwhite population of the
districts in the 1972 plan provided an additional reason for the Attorney
General to ask for an increase in the size of the nonwhite majorities in
certain districts. The legislature used the higher of the two sets of estimates, and the actual nonwhite population may have been somewhat
lower. See Table 3, supra, n. 8.
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We think it was reasonable for the Attorney General to
conclude that a substantial nonwhite population majorityin the vicinity of 65%-would be required to achieve a nonwhite majority of eligible voters.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
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JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL

Re: No. 75-104, United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh. Inc .
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Dear Byron:
Please show me as not participating in this one .
Sincerely.

7.1'/(.
T . M.
Mr . Justice White
cc : The Conference

Nov. 23, 1976
MEMORANDUM
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Dave Martin
No. 75-104

United Jewish Organizations v. Carey

As we have discussed, Justice White's cirrulated opinion
seems to go off on an unfortunate tangent.

It impliedly

reviews the merits of the AG's decision to object xaxxke under the
Voting Rights Act to New York's 1972 reapportionment.

Finding

his objection reasonable, the opinion essentially concludes
that therefore petitioners' Fourteenth and

Fift~nth

Amendment

rights were not violated.
I would approach the case quite differently.

Since it

involves the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, I would
rest the decision on this Court's precedents under

th~~

nth• ..

Amendments, aRaxxkexAGxxxa&£ixisR$£am&xxiRXBRiJXX&Rg&RxiallJ¥
bringing the AG's decision in only tangentially, for what
it may tell us about the legislature's purpose in enacting
the 1974 plan.
The key Fourteenth Amendment case should be Washington v.
Davis.

The question here is whether the 1974 reapportionment

guidance:
412

u.s.

124; White v. Regester,
755.

The question in those cases was whether multi-

member legislative districts were employed "to minimize or cancel
out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the
voting population."

itw iB ••• 'Piela •hat! i:w e:oald as t flzra

-2the districts
~Ft
A plaintiff alleging that/~ were so employed h d m~how more
than that miRaxik¥xgaRaiaaxHx minority-supported candidates
~

~Alosing

elections.

He must show that "this segment of

the population is being denied access to the political system,"
403 U.S., at 155, or that "the political processes leading to
nomination and election were not equally open to participation
by the groop ifuestion," 412 U.S., at 766.
The Fifteenth Amendment cases, Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S.
52, and gammtiliaR Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, add
little.

They do indicate

to segregate,"

that~

if the lines amount to a "contrivance

376 U.S., at 57, they are invalid.

Applying these principles to the facts here yields a holding
that there ix has been
af/no constitutional violation. Taking "effect" as our starting
point (Arlington Heights), there is no

-

-

disfavoring whites.
have majorities in

-=-

disprope~tionate

impact

If we look to Kings County as a whole, whites
Q.
xiigkki~xmaxHxaixxxigxxxaxxl~percentage

of

districts slightly higher than their percentage of total popula-

tion~--assuming arguendo that this type of statistic is relevant.
Looking to other possible evidence of discriminatory intent, we
find that the legislature was indeed quite conscious of race
when it drew the 1974 lines.
the • same as discriminatory

But consciousness of race is not

o.lk:

purpo~e~ ~~

~ ~seri\Mi~ i$ (''~'~·

prompt

~,

ie 8v&s

~Ka~mxx

Discriminatory purpooe implies either a desire

concern~

to harm
to segregate."

;t-

the target groupfor at least a "contrivance
Nothing in the record supports a finding of

intent to harm or

~egregate.

And thes· ,

; sequence of events

bolsters a finding that the legislature's race-consciousness was
not discriminatory.

The legislature was

acting in response to

-3-

the AG's objection. Though it disagreed with his disapproval
I'P72
of the~ plan, it felt it did not have time to challenge the
AG in court.

Its race-consciousness stemmed from its desire

to pass a plan that would survive the AG's scrutiny, not its
desire to harm whites.
The Chavis and Regester standards support this conclusion.
Nothing in the reccrd suggests that the political processes
in Kings County have not been equally open to the participation
of whites.
Somewhere I would make clear that we do not have before
and we ex~ress no views on its validity.
us for review the merits of the AG s decision to object,/ ~
•

It

.

-----.....---

-------

~Qj I

D.M.

--

..,

'!' ·

"'' '·'

... ..:.t

~

....

.

r:.''

.J

l

'
T,
l

.... '-~

t

l

.

','

.

~

;"

L

u Ll ) : .... ~t:l l:llaokmun
Jm.. t.tce I- ow l l
Mr. Ju.,n.' ce R~:hnquis t
Mr. Just i ce Stevens

Mr.
·Ir.

From : Mr. Justice Stewart
Circulated:
1st DRAFT

ov 8 0

197.&--

Recirculated : ________

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATFlJ
No. 75- 104
United Jewish Organizations
of Williamsburgh, Inc.,
On Writ of Certiorari to the
et al., Petitioners,
United States Court of Ap ..
v.
peals for the Second Circuit.
H u~h L. Carey et al.
[December -, 1976]

MR. JusTICE STEWART, concurring.
The question presented for decision in this case is whether
New York's use of racial criteria in redistricting Kings County
violated the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. The pe"
titioners' contention is essentially that racial awareness in
iegislative reapportionment is unconstitutional per se. Acceptance of their position would mark an egregious departure
from the way this Court has in the past analyzed the constitutionality of claimed discrimination in dealing with the
elective franchise on the basis of race.
The petitioners have made no showing that a racial criterion was used as a basis for denying them their right to
vote, in contravention of the Fifteenth Amendment. See
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339. They have made no
showing that the redistricting scheme was employed as part
of a "contrivance to segregate" ; to minimize or cancel out
the voting strength of a minority class or interest; or otherwise to impair or burden the opportunity of affected persons
to participate in the political process. See Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52. 58 ; Whit e v. R egester, 412 U. S. 755 :
·ouisiana v. United States, 380 U. S. 145; Fortson v. Dorsey,
379 U. S. 433.
~ record here cannot support a finding that the redis•l
tricting plan undervalued the political power of white voter~
elative to their numbers in Kings County. Cf. City of
~
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Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358:-:A
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,..~c:..o,purpose with which the }l"ev. Y m k begislahtPe~ acted-in re- ~ +-V A.
r•'.,
~
-.j-C..-! -.ft.~. sponse to the position of the United States Department of
t:. ~
,~.AJ~
to'•'+-iu...l f1'Citel :-~ Justice under the Voting Rights Act-forecloses any finding -tc
D"o ; '
;"" K,;. ~ ~ '/
that the Legislature acted with the in~dious 2urpose of
~ J ~; ':' ~
~~·~'(,·e..,l
e.fo'
discriminating against the participation of white voters in \I~J:/t" &AV"t'. f, ~'f' ~C4..~
• 1
*
A ~~
'
I'
t.:V'-"'~~
l rH~ ,vflc t h e po1'1t1Ca
process.
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1_ 0
;v ?_ \)~ r~. I '
r Having failed to show that the legislative reapportionment
' I ' l I ~ ~ S'
~~ vf~\
C-1 'T"1 'tiNt · plan had either the purpose or the effect; of discriminating ~ 1 t-1" 1 c 'I
J
J
Sf tJ t,.;, i-to v.
~gainst them on the basis of their race, the petitioners have
II. . ~ ~ Lfi'J.. t).t .('".offered no basis for affording them the constitutional relief
1
•
'~
......- - l they seek. Accordingly, I join the judgment of the Court.
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*It is unnecessary to consider whether the position of the Department
of Justice in this case was required or even authorized by the Voting
Rights Act. It is enough to note that .Hwril:etrmr"ffi'rlttrHI::ci:r""1l:l'lt4--t.he_;_~
-~~~·~~~~~~~~~~t~~~
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393 U. 8. 544; GefYI'giQ-V:" u-nited St~,_4..ll u-. £.:-52&;-and...that the procedures followed in this case were consistent with the Act. Congress has:
established an exclusive forum-the District Court for the District of
Columbia-and provided exclusive standing in the state or political subdivision to raise the issue of substantive compliance with the Act. 42
U. S. C. § 1973l (b). That procedure was not. invoked by New York
here, and the issue of statt~tor:y compliance is consequently not properly·
befor.e us ..
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Mn. JusTICE STF)VENS, concurring.
In my opinion this case raises a basic issur which cannot
be avoided by placing decision on the Voting Rights Act.
N C''iV York has relird on racial factors in drawing voting
district boundaries in threr counties. This action is taken
on the assumption that voters in thrse counties will tend to
vote for candidates who arc members of their own race.
On that af.:sumption, viewing the area as a whole. the plan
minimizes the likelihood that black citizens will be underrepresented in the legislature; in this sense, it is designed
\ to avoid a discriminatory effect on this class of citizens.
On the other hand, again making the assumptio11 that
votes will be cast along racial lines, viewing the problem
from the point of view of particular white voters in the district in which these 11etitioners reside, the plan minimizes
the likelihood that they will be represented by a member
of their own race. Therefore, the plan is designed to have
a discriminatory effect on particular citizens in these districts.
The basic question raised by this case is whether that delib\ erate discrimination on account of race is constitut·
ecause race IS mere y one o severa po 1 ICal characteristics that responsible legislators will inevitably consider when
drawing political boundaries, I am satisfied that a plan is not
automatically invalidated by showing that racial factors were
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used to determine particular boundaries. More narrowly, I
am satisfied tha.t the plan adopted by New York for these
three counties is on<' which the State Legislature could
have adopted independently without violating the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.. See
Cousins v. City Coundl of City of Chicago, 466 F. 2d 830,
848-853, 854-856 (CA7 1972) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). If
that were not my view, howevrr, I could not uphold the plan
on the strength of the f<'dcral statute on which the Court
relics.
The Court's holding that the plan is acceptable rests
squarely on the fact that New York is a State subject to
the Voting Rights Act of 1965.' In so limiting its holding,
the Court implicitly assumes that the federal statute-which
was enacted to implement the Fourteenth Amendment-may
authorize conduct which would violate that amendment if
it "·ere not so authori7.cd. 2 I regard that assumption, and
Opinion, nt 9-10, supra.
"I believe this to be a fnir re:tding of tho Court's opinion. The following (Jnot:ttion is from p. 14, supra:
"Implicit in Beer and City of Richmond, thrn, is tho propo,;ilion that
a St:ttc subject to the Voting Rights Aet. may redistrict along rarinl lines
to purge its rcapportionmrnt plnn of a. discriminatory cfroc1. Th:tt propo,,ition must be rcjrctcd if wo nrc to n.crc11t petitioners' viow thnt rnrinl
criteria may be usrd, if at nil, onlv to eliminate thr rffoct.'l of a p;1~t. diserimination in appointmPnt.. However, we decline to hold t h:tt the Voting
Rights Act, as construed hy this Court in Beer, is an nnconstitnt ionnl
exercise of congressional nnthority to implement the Fouri cent h :mel Fi ftPrnth Amendments. Cf. Katzenbach v. l\1oTgan, 384 IT. 8. 041 (1966):
South CaTalina v. Katzenbach. supra. Rather, we hold that thiH n~e of
r:tci:ll criteria to ~hare up the Yoting potential of nonwhite voters in :l.
reasonable nttempl to comply with § 5 docs not violate the Constitniion."
This paragraph JH'o\·ides a rrtrospoc:tivc cndorscmpnt. of the application
of rn,eial criteria in those rnsr:;, but docs not, of course, rnclor~e :l.Il~' possible usc which might be m:~dc of rarial criteria in the futmc. The
rrm:1indrr of the Court's opinion is ::tn rxnmination of thr action of the
New York Lcgi~laiurc in light of the dic:tatc~ of the Voting Rights :\et.
But nowhere docs the Court purport to add res:; or dcciclo whether i he
1
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therefore the Court's attempt to decide this case on a "narrow" rationale as untenable.
If the Fourteenth Amendment would prevent the New
York Legislature from drawing these lines independently, I do
not believe that either the Congress or the Attorney General
of the United States could remedy the constitutional defect.
Or, to put the same thought in a slightly different way, if
the Attorney General's benign purpose protects these boundaries from constitutional attack, there is no reason why the
State Legislature could not act on the basis of precisely
the same motivation and be equally protected from constitutional attack.
It is, of course, perfectly clear that New York did rely,
in part, on racial factors in drawing these district boundaries
and that such reliance has operated to the disadvantage
of certain members of the white race. I believe the Court
has implicitly and correctly held that such reliance does not
necessarily invalidate the State's action. I therefore concur
in the judgment.

employment of racia.l criteria in dcsi~ning the scheme enacted here comports with the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. In fact the Court
specifically decline;o to address or decide that question in n. 16, at 10,
supra.
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JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

\

December 2, 1976

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

No. 75-104 - United Jewish Organizations v. Carey

The risk of circulating a draft in this case with
a rationale for which there was little enthusiasm at
conference has perhaps been verified. Although shortly
there will be another circulation taking essentially the
same course, but with modifications, it is doubtful that
it will garner the necessary votes. In that event, I
shall redo the opinion and reflect what I understand to
be the majority view--which I share--that a State may,
without relying on the Voting Rights Act, use racial
considerations in distr~cting at least to the extent
necessary to validate New York 1 s actions in thi.s case.
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C HAI-1lJLRS OF

J UST I CE WM -.L BRf: N N AN, J R.

December 3, 1976

RE: No. 75-104
Dear Byron :
I agree with the basic approach of your present circulation because I think we ought to avoid if possible reaching the broader question of the constitutionalty of
"quotaizing" districts in the reapportionment process. I
am preparing a concurrence elaborating my views but also
hope I may be able to join your circulation.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice White
cc : The Conference
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December 8, 1976

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 75-104- United Jewish Organizations v. Carey

Dear Byron:
Please join me in your circulation of December 7.

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice White

cc:

The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

December 8, 1976

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 7 5-l 04 - United Jewish Organizations v. Carey

Dear Byron:
Please join me in your circulation of December 7.

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice White

cc:

The Conference

To: The Chief Justice
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MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, concurring.:::~

The Court effectively demonstrates that prior cases un..
questionably establish the Attorney General's expansive au. • ~·
thority to oversee legislative redistricting under § 5 of the ~-_,.. ··~5:/L
Voting Rights Act. See, e. g., Georgia v. United States, ~
411 U.S. 526, 532 (1973); Allen v. State Board of Elections, ~ ~
-393 U. S, 544, 566, 569 (1969). Yet this is only the first _,... 0 ~~ ~ tt-c_
step to analysis, for, however expansive, the breadth of that~- ~
authority is not without limits with respect to its effect on \{ ~ .white voters. Therefore, although I can subscribe to the
Court's opinion, I add these words to indicate that I find
·
the roaqblocks to its reseult somewhat more difficult to
overcome.
The one starkly clear fact of this case is that an overt
racial number was employed to effect petitioners' assignment
to voting districts. In brief, following the Attorney General's refusal to certify the 1972 reapportionment under his
§ 5 powers, unnamed Justice Department officials made known
that satisfaction of the Voting Rights Act in Brooklyn would
necessitate creation by the state legislature of 10 state Assembly and Senate districts with threshold nonwhite populations of 65 7o . Prompted by the necessity of preventing
interference with the upcoming 1974 election, state officials
complied. Thus, even though the Court correctly notes thf\.t

Ac.:*-
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§ 5 is set in operation through prospective "screening procedures," ante, at 10, the Justice Department's unofficial
instruction to state officials effectively resulted in an explicit process of assignment to voting districts pursuant to
race. The result of this process was a county-wide pattern
of districting closely approximating proportional representa~
tion. While it is true that this demographic outcome did
not "underrepresent the white population" throughout the
county, ante, at 8,-indeed, the very definition of propor..
tional representation precludes either under- or over-representation-these particular petitioners filed suit to complain
that they have been subjected to a process of classification
on the basis of race that adversely altered their status.
If we were presented here with a classification of voters
motivated by racial animus, City of Richmond v. United
States, 422 U. S. 358, 378 (1975); Wright v. Rockefeller,
376 U. S. 52, 58 (1964); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S.
339, 347 ( 1960), or with a classification that effectively
downgraded minority participation in the franchise, Georgia
v. United States, supra, 411 U. S., at 534; Whitcomb v.
Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 144 (1971), we promptly would
characterize the resort to race as "suspect" and prohibit
its use. Under such circumstances, the tainted apportionment process would not necessarily be saved by its proportional outcome, for the segregation of voters into "separate
but equal" blocs still might well have the intent or effect
of diluting the voting power of minority voters. See, e. g.,
City of Richmond v. United States, supra, 422 U. S., at 378;
Wright v. Rockefeller, supra, 376 U. S., at 53-54. It follows,
therefore, that if the racial redistricting involved here, imposed with the avowed intention of clustering together 10
viable nonwhite majorities at the expense of pre-existing
white groupings, is not similarly to be prohibited, the distinctiveness that avoids this prohibition must arise from
~ither or both of two considerations~ the permissibility ,Qf

>
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affording preferential treatment to disadvantaged nonwhites
generally, or the particularized application of the Voting
Rights Act in this instance.
The first and broader of the two plausible distinctions
rests upon the general propriety of so-called benign discrimination: the challenged race assignment may be permissible because it is cast in a remedial context with respect
to a disadvantaged class rather than in a setting that aims
to demean or insult any racial group. Even in the absence
of the Voting Rights Act, this preferential policy plausibly
could find expression in a state decision to overcome nonwhite disadvantages in voter registration or turnout through
redefinition of electoral districts-perhaps, as here, through
the application of a numerical rule~in order to achieve a
proportional distribution of voting power. Neither the
propriety, nor indeed the full significance, of such a preferential policy, however, has ever been addressed by this
Court. I, like the Court, ante, at 15, and unlike my Brother
STEVENS, post, am wholly content to leave this thorny question until another day, for I a.m convinced that the existence of the Voting Rights Act makes such a decision unnecessary and alone suffices to support an affirmance of the
judgment before us.
I begin with the settled principle that not every remedial
use of race is forbidden. For example, we have authorized
and even required race-conscious remedies in a variety of
corrective settings. See, e. g., Swann v. Charlotte-M ecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 25 (1971); United
States v. Montgomery Board of Education, 395 U. S. 225
(1969); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 44 U. S. L. W.
4356, 4363 (1976). Once it is established that circumstances
exist where race may be taken into account in fashioning
affirmative policies/ we must identify those circumstances,
Of course, it could be argued that the remedial rules upheld in these
rearlier cases acquired a.dded legitimacy because they arose in the form of
1
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and, further, determine how substantial a reliance may be
placed upon race. If resort to the 65% rule involved
here is not to be sanctioned, that must be because the benign
use of such a binding numerical criterion (under the Voting
Rights Act) generates problems of constitutional dimension
that are not relevant to other, previously tolerated raceconscious remedies. As a focus for consideration of what
these problems might or might not be, it is instructive to
consider some of the objections frequently raised to the use
of overt preferential race assignment practices.
First, a purportedly preferential race assignment ma.y in fact
disguise a policy that perpetuates disadvantageous treatment of
the plan's supposed beneficiaries. Accordingly, courts might
face considerable difficulty in ascertaining whether a given race
classification truly furthers benign rather than illicit objectives.
An effort to achieve proportional representation, for example,
might be aimed at aiding a group's participation in the political
processes by guaranteeing safe political offices, or, on the
other ha.nd, might be a "contrivance to segregate" the group,
Wright v. Rockefeller, supra, 376 U. S., at 58, thereby
frustrating its potentially successful efforts at coalition building across racial lines. Compare, e. g., the positions of the
biack plaintiffs in Wright, at 53-54, with the black interjudicial decrees rather than affirmative legislat5ve or executive action. I
agrer that a court-imposed remedy to correct a ripe finding of discrimination should be accorded particular respect. Yet, the role of the
judiciary is not decisive. First, as is the case here, even a legislative
policy of remedial action can be closely t.ied to prior discriminatory
practices or patterns. See infra, at 9. Second, many of the criticisms
discussed below that commonly are leveled against the benign use of racial
remedies-e. g., the potential for arousing race consciousness and the likelihood of imposing disproportionate burdens of compliance upon relatively
~'innocent" whites-remain relevant regardless of the decisionmaker who
imposes the remedial regime. I believe, therefore, that. the history ·Of
equitable decrees utilizing racial criteria fairly rstablishes the broad pr.inc
ciple that race may play a. legitlrnate role iP remedial JlOiici~. .

I

1

J.

~

~
~

75-104-CONCUR (B)
UNITED JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS v. CAREY

5

venors, id., at 62 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Indeed, even the
present case is not entirely free of complaints that benignity
is not the true characteristic of the remedial redistricting.
Puerto Rican groups, for example, who have been joined
with black groups to establish the "nonwhite" category,
protested to the Attorney General that their political
strength under the 1974 reapportionment actually is
weaker than under the invalidated 1972 districting. Appendix, at 295. A black group similarly complained of the loss
of a "safe" seat because of the inadequacy of the 65ro
minimum figure. !d., at 296-297. These particular objections, as the Attorney General argued in his memorandum
endorsing the 1974 reapportionment, may be ill advised and
unpersuasive. Nevertheless, they illustrate the risk that
what is presented as an instance of benign race assignment in fact may prove to be otherwise. This concern, of
course, does not undercut the theoretical legitimacy or usefulness of preferential policies. At the minimum, however, it
does suggest the need for careful considera.tion of the
operation of ~:~-ny racial device, even one cloaked in preferential garb. And if judicial detection of truly benign policies
proves impossiblE} or excessively crude, that alone might
warrant invalidating any race-drawn line.
Second, even in the pursuit of remedial objectives, an
explicit policy of assignment by race may serve to stimulate
our society's latent race consciousness, suggesting the utility
and propriety of basing decisions on a factor that ideally
bears no rela.tionship to an individual's worth or needs.
See, e. g. , Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequa1 World :
Equality for the Negro___:The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U. L. Rev. 363, 379-380 (1966). Furthermore, even preferential treatment may act to stigma.tize
its recipient groups, for although intended to correct systemic or institutional inequities, such a policy may imply
to some the recipients' inferiority and especial need for

'

'

I
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protection .2 Again , these matters would not necessarily
speak against the wisdom or permissibility of selective, benign
racial classifications. But they demonstrate that the considerations that historically led us to treat race as a constitutionally "suspect" method of classifying individuals are
not entirely vitiated in a preferential context.
Third, especially when interpreting the broad principles
embraced by the Equal Protection Clause, we cannot well
ignore the social reality that even a benign policy of assignment by race is viewed as unjust by many in our society,
especially by those individuals who are adversely effected
by a given classification. This impression of injustice may
be heightened by the natural consequence of our governing·
processes that the most "discrete and insular" of whites often
will be called upon to bear the immediate, direct costs of
benign discrimination. See e. g., Kaplan , supra, at 373-374;
cf. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination , 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723, 737- 738 (1974). Perhaps not
surprisingly, there are indications that this case affords an example of just such decisionmaking in operation. For example, the intervenor NAACP takes pains to emphasize that
the mandated 65 r(' rule could have been atta.ined through
redistricting strategies that did not slice the Hasidic commu-.
nity in half. State authorities, however, chose to localize
the burdens of race reassignment upon the petitioners rather
than to redistribute a more varied and diffused range of
whites into predominantly nonwhite districts. NAACP·
2
This phenomenon seem ~ to have arisen with respect to policies affording preferentcial t reatment to women : thus grou ps dedicat ed to advancing·
the legal position of women have itppcared before this Court to challenge·
statutes t hat. facially offer advantages to wom !:'n and not men. See, e. g.,.
Kahn v. Shevin. 416 U.S . 351 (19.74). This strat egy, one surmises, can
be explained on the basis t hat even good-faith policies favoring women
may serve t<J highlight stereotype,; con cerning the..i r supposed dependenc,y,·
(lllc{ helr:le;;sn~.
·
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Brief, at 29-31. I am in no position to determine the accuracy of this appraisal, but the impression of unfairness is
magnified when a coherent group like the Hasidim disproportionately bears the adverse consequences of a race assignment
policy.
In my view, when a decisionmaker embarks on a policy
of benign racial sorting, he must weigh the concerns that
I have discussed against the need for effective social policies
promoting racial • justice in a society beset by deep-rooted
racial inequities. But I believe that Congress here adequately struck that balance in enacting the carefully con;ceived remedial scheme embodied in the Voting Rights Act.
However the Court ultimately decides the consbtutwt{al
legitimacy of "reverse discrimination " pure and simple, I am
convinced that the application of the Voting Rights Act substantially minimizes the objections to preferential treatment,
and legitimates the use of even overt, numerical racial devices
in electoral redistricting.
The participation of the Attorney General, for example,
largely relieves the judiciary of the need to grapple with the
difficulties of distinguishing benign from malign discrimination. Under § 5 of the Act, the Attorney General in effect
is constituted champion of the interests of minority voters, •
and accompanying implementing regulations ensure the
availability of materials and submissions necessary to dis.,
cern th e true effect of a proposed reapportionment plan.
See 28 CFR § 51.19. This initial right of review, coupled
with the fact-finding competence of the Justice Department,
substantially reduces the likelihood that a complicated reapportionment plan that silently furthers malign racial policies would escape detection by appropriate officials. As a
practical matter, therefore, I am prepared to accord considerable deference to the judgment of the Attorney Genera]
that a particular districting scheme complies with the remedial objectives furthered by the Voting Rights Act.

I
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Similarly, the history of the Voting Rights Act provides
reassurance that, in the face of the potential for reinvigorating racial partisanship, the congressional decision to authorize the use of race-oriented remedies in this context was
the product of substantial and careful deliberations. Enacted following "voluminous legislative'' consideration, South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 , 309 (1966) , the Voting
Rights Act represents an unequivocal and well-defined congressional consensus on the national need for "sterner and
more elaborate measures," ibid., to secure the promise of
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments with respect
to exercise of the franchise.
Insofar as the drawing of
district lines is a process that intrinsically involves numerical calcula.tions, and insofar as state officials cha.rged
with the task of defining electora.l constituencies are unlikely
simply to close their eyes to considerations such as race and
national origin, 3 the resort to a numerical racial criterion as
a method of securing compliance with the aims of the Voting Rights Act is, in my view, consistent with that consensus. Whatever may be the indirect and undesirable counter~
educational costs of employing such far-reaching racial
devices, Congress had to confront these considerations before
opting for an activist race-conscious remedial role supervised by federal Officials. The "insidious and pervasive" evil
8 It would be naive to suppose that racial considerations do not enter
into apportionment decisions. A variety of motivations could produce
'SUch a reliance upon Tace: e. g., the desire to injure a race, a conscious
decision to distribute vot ing power among a variet.y of wdl-defined racial
and ethnic groups or neighborhoods, or an attempt to employ race as a
proxy for political affi liation . Cf. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735,
753-754 (1973) . The relative difficulty of isolating these motivations in
this closeted decisionmaking cont ext, and the further difficulty of deciding
which of these motives should be permissible given the realities of the
.apport ionment process, undoubt f>dly explains § 5's prohibition of practices
that either "have the purpose . . . [or] effect of denying or abridging
fh e right to vote on account of race Qf color , .. ,"
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of voting rights violations, id., at 309, and the "specially informed legislative competence" in this area, Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 , 656 (1966); cf.. Morton v. Mancari,
417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974), argue in support of the legitimacy )
of the federal decision to permit a broad range of raceconscious remedial techniques, including, as here, outright
assignment by race.
I must, of course, address the objection expressed by a
variety of participants in this litigation : that this reapportion~ent worked the injustice of localizing the direct burdens of r~:~.cial assignment upon a morally undifferentiated
group of whites,4 and, indeed, & group that &rguably is
peculiarly vulnerable to such injustice. This &rgument has
both normative and emotional appe~tl , but for a variety of
reasons I am convinced that the Voting Rights Act drains
it of vitality.
First, it is important to recall that the Attorney General's
oversight focuses upon jurisdictions whose prior practices
exhibited the purpose or effect of infringing the right to vote
on account of race, thereby triggering § 4 of the Act, 42
U. S. C. § 1.973 (b). This direct nexus to localities with
a history of discriminatory practices or effects enhances the
legitimacy of the Attorney General's remedial authority over
individuals within those communities who benefited (as
whites) from those earlier discriminatory voting patterns.
Moreover, tbe obvious remedial nature of the Act and its
enactment by an elected Congress that hardly can be viewed
as dominated by nonwhite representatives belies any possibility that the decisionmaker intended a racial insult or
I find not hing in t he record to suggestr-a.nd such a proposition seems:
implausible-t hat the Ha.'lidim bear any unique responsibility for the
decisions t hat led to discriminatory voting practices or effects in Brooklyn. Nor is there any cont.ention t hat petit.ionen:; derived special benefit3:
from the prior discriminatory policies, ot her than to t he extent that the·
'QY{lrall white voice cotJntywid.e was strengthened.
4
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InJUry to those whites who are adversely affected by the
operation of the Act's provisions. Finally, petitioners have
not been deprived of their right to vote, a consideration that
minimizes the detrimental impact of the remedial racial policies governing the § 5 reapportionment. True, petitioners
are denied the opportunity to vote as a group in accordance
with the earlier districting configuration, but they do not press
any legal claim to a group voice as Hasidim. Petitioners
Brief, at 6 n. 6. In terms of their voting interests, then, the
burden that they claim to suffer must be attributable solely to
their relegation to increased nonwhite-dominated districts.
Yet, to the extent that white and nonwhite interests and sentiments are polarized in Brooklyn. the petitioners still are
indirectly "protected" by the remaining white Assembly and
Senate districts within the county, carefully preserved in
accordance with the white proportion of the total county
population. While these considerations obviously do not
satisfy petitioners, I am persuaded that they reinforce the
legitimacy of this remedy.
Since I find nothing in the Court's opinion that is incon&is~nt with the views expressed herein, l join that opinion.
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Under the Fourteenth Amendment the question is whether
the reapportionment plan represents purposeful discrimination
against white voters.
Disproportionate

Washington v. Davis, 426

~pact

purpose was present.

u.s. ___•

may afford evidence that an invidious

Arlington Heights.

But the record

here does not support a finding of such purpose or that the
redistricting plan undervalued the political power of white
voters relative to their numbers in Kings County.
City of Richmond v. United States, 422

u.s.

358.

Cf.
The legis-·

lature was conscious of race when it drew the district lines,
but such consciousness is not the equivalent of discriminatory
intent.

The clear purpose with which the New York legislature

acted - in response to the position of the United States
Department of Justice under the Voting Rights Act - forecloses any finding that it acted with the iaeidious purpose
of discriminating against the participation of white voters
in the political process.*
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The question presented is whether, in the circumstances of
this case, the use of racial criteria by the State of New York
in its attempt to comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights
Act and to secure the approval of the Attorney General
violated the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment.

I
Kings County, N. Y., together with New York (Manhattan) and Bronx Counties. became subject to §§ 4 and 5
of the Act, by virtue of a determination by the Attorney
General that a literacy test was used in these three counties
as of November 1, 1968, and a determination by the Director
of the Census that fewer than 50o/o of the voting-age residents
of these three counties voted in the presidential election of
1968. 2 Litigation to secure exemption from the Act was
unsuccessful, 3 and it became necessary for New York to
ard, pra.ctice, or procedure: Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite,
standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced without such proceeding
if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has
'been submitted 'by tbe chief legal officer or other approptiate official of
such State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney
General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such
submission, except that neither the Attorney General's failure to object
nor a declaratory ·judgment entered under this sertion shall bar a o;ubsequent action to erijoin enforcement of such qualification, prerequisite,
standard, practice, ·or proc~dure. Any action under this srction shall be
heard and determined by a court of three judges ·in accordance with
the provisions of section 2284 of Title 28 and any appeal shall lie to·
the Supreme Court."
A legislative reapportionment is a "stand:1rd, practice, or procedure with
·respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November I ,
1968," within the menning of § 5. Sre pp . 11-12, infra .
2 See 42 U.S. C.§ 1973b (b) .
a The State of New York brought an action to obtain a statutory
exemption for the three countirs undrr § 4 (a) of the Act, serking it
declaratory · ju'dgment that its literacy test had not been usrd within the
10 years preceding the filing of the suit "for the purpose or with the
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
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secure the approval of the Attorney General or of the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia for its
1972 reapportionment statute insofar as that statute concerned Kings, New York, and Bronx Counties. On January 31, 1974, the provisions of the statute districting these
counties for congressional, state senate, and state assembly
seats were submitted to the Attorney General. In accordance with the regulations governing his § 5 review, the Attorney General considered submissions from interested parties
criticizing and defending the plan.4 Those submissions included assertions that voting in these counties was racially
polarized and that the district lines had been created with
the purpose or effect of diluting the voting strength of
color." 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (a). After several years of litigation, the
District Court for the District of Columbia denied the exemption and
ordered the State to comply with the filing requirements of § 5. This
Court summarily affirmed. New Yol'k on Behalf of New York County v.
United States, 419 U. S. 888 (1974). See 510 F. 2d, at 516.
4
Section 51.19, 28 C. F. R. provides:
"Section 5, in providing for submission to the Attorney G€ncral as an
alternntive to seeking a declaratory judgment from the U. S. District
Court for the District of Columbia, imposes on the Attorney General
what is cssent ially a judicial function. Therefore, the burden of proof on
the submitting autJ10rity is the same in submitting changes to the Attorney General as it would be in submitting changes to the District. Court
for the District of Columbia. The Attorney General shall base his decision
on a review of material presented by the submitting authority, relevant
information provided by individuals or groups, and the results of any
investigation conducted by the Department of Justice. If the Attorney
General is satisfied that the submitted change does not have a racially
discrimu1atory purpose or effect, he will not object to the change and wilt
so notify the submitting authority. If the Attorney General determines
that the submitted change hns a racially discriminatory purpose or effect,
he will enter an objection and will so notify the submitting authority.
If the evidence as to the purpose or effect of the cha.nge is conflicting,
and the Attorney Grncral is unable to resolve the conflict within the
60-day period, he shall, consistent with the above-described burden of
proof applicable in t hr District Court, enter an objection and so notify
the submitting authority."
·
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nonwhites (blacks and Puerto Ricans).n On April 1, 1974,
the Attorney General concluded that, as to certain districts
in Kings County covering the Bedford-Stuyvesant area of
Brooklyn, the State had not met the burden placed on it
by § 5 and the regulations thereunder to demonstrate that
the redistricting had neither the purpose nor the effect of
abridging the right to vote by reason of race or color. 6
Under § 5, the State could have challenged the Attorney
General's objections .to the redistricting plan by filing a
declaratory judgment action in a three-judge court in the
5 The record in t.his Court contains only part of the material· :submitted
to and considered by the Attorney General in his review of the 1972 plan.
Includ<'d in the presrnt. record are a memorandum submitted on behalf
of the NAACP and letters from ·everal prominent bbck and Puerto
Rican elected officials, all opposing the plan. Not included in the record
are materials defending the plan submitted by the reapportionment committee of the New York legislature, the state attorney general, and several state legislators. Brief for the United States, at 8, and n. 9.
The NAACP, the Attorney General, and the court below classified
Puerto Ricans in New York together with blacks as a minority group
entitled to the protections of the Voting Rights Act. Hereinafter we
usc the term "nonwhite" to refer to blacks and Puerto Ricans, althongh
small nnmbrrs of other nonwhite groups (such as oricntali:i) are abO>
included in the nonwhite population statistics.
6 The basis for the Attorney General's conclusion that "the proscribed!
rffect may exist" as to certain state assembly and senate districts in Kings
County wn.~ explained in his letter to the New York state authorities as,
follows:
"Senate district 18 appears to have an abnonnally high minority concentration while adjoining minority neighborhoods are significantly diffused into surrounding districts. In the less populous proposed assembly
districts, the minority population appca rs to be concentrated into districts 53, 54, 55 and 56, while minority neighborhoods adjoining thosedistrict.~ are diffused into a number of other districts. . . . [Wle know
·o f no necPS!:-iity for sueh configuration and brlicve other rational alternatives exist."
The Attorney Genf'ml abo objected to the congressional districting in!
King County and to the 8tate legislative districting in New York County ..
The di,~t~ictin~ for these s.cat.\\ is nqt a~ i~su.e i.n thi::; litigation.
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District of Columbia. Instead, the State sought to meet
what it understood to be the Attorney General's objections
and to secure his approval in order that the 1974 primary
and general elections could go forward under the 1972
statute. 7 A revised plan, submitted to the Attorney General
on May 31, 1974, in its essentials did not change the number
of districts with nonwhite majorities. but did change the
size of the nonwhite majorities in almost all of those districts.
Under the 1972 plan. Kings County had three state senate
districts with nonwhite majorities of approximately 91%.
61%, and 531c; under the revised 1974 plan, there were again
three districts with nonwhite majorities, but now all three
were between 701c and 75% nonwhite." As for state assembly
districts, both the 1972 and the 1974 plans provided for
seven districts with nonwhite majorities. However, under
the 1972 plan, there were four between 85% and 95% nonwhite, and three were approximately 767o, 61%, and 52%,
respectively; under the 1974 plan, the two smallest nonwhite
majorities were increased to 65% and 67.5%, and the two
largest nonwhite majorities were decreased from greater than
7 The State was also under pressure from a. private suit to compel
enactment of new district, lines consistent with the views of the Attorney
General. NAACP v. New York City Board of Elections, SDNY 72 Civ.
1460. Sec 510 F. 2d, at 517 n. o.
8 The 1972 perecntnges are taken from Table 3, accompanying the
memornndum in supp01t of tlte motions to dismi.<;S of the applicants for
intervention, record at 265, except for tl1e ul% figure, which is for a·
district only partially in Kings County. That figure is taken from the
Brief for thr United Stat!•s, at 5:3. nne! rC'presC'nts the black nnd Purrto
Rican populntion rather than all nonwhitr>'. Thr 1974 perrentagC's :ue·
taken from the Interim Rc•port of tlw Joint Committee on HC'apportionment, app., at 179-11\0.
The 1974 plan crented nonwhite mnjorihes in two state sennte districts·
that were majority white under the 1972 plan (the 17th and the 23d),
but erented white majorities in two districts that were majorit·y nonwhite
under the 1972 plan (the loth and. the 25th) . See Brief for the Unit,ed

StatC'.S,. at 53..
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90 % to between 80 % and 90 %.0 The report of the lcgisla~
tive committee on reapportionment stated that these changes
were made "to overcome Justice Department obj ections" by
creating more "substantial nonwhite majorities" in two as~
sembly districts and two senate districts. 10
One of the communities affected by these revisions in the
Kings County reapportionment plan was the Williamsburgh
area, where about 30,000 Hasidic Jews live. Under the 1972
plan, the Hasidic community was located entirely in one
assembly district (61% nonwhite) and one senate district
(37o/c nonwhite); in order to create substantial nonwhite
majorities in these districts, the 1974 revisions split the
Hasidic community between two senate and two assembly
districts. A staff member of the legislative reapportionment
committee testified that in the course of meetings and telephone conversations with Justice Department officials, he
"got the feeling . . . that 65 percent would be probably an
approved figure" for the nonwhik population in the assembly
district in which the Hasidic community was located, a dis~
trict approximately 61 %'· nonwhite under the 1972 plan. 1 1
To attain the 65 % figure, a portion of the white population ,
including part of the Hasidic community, was reassigned to
an adjoining district.
Shortly after the State submitted this revised redistricting
plan for Kings County to the Attorney General petitioners
sued on behalf of the Hasidic Jewish community of Williamsburgh, alleging that the 1974 plan "would dilute the value
of each plaintiff's franchise by halving its effectiveness," solely
for the purpose of achieving a racial quota and therefore·
0 Tablr 3, supra . n . , . app ., 266: lntrrim R Pport , supra, n. R, app ..
195 ; Brief l'or 1llC Unit Pd St<tt r,.., npp ., at 54. s('(' 510 F . 2d, at 523'

11.

21 .

Int r rim Hr port , supra, n . , app., 179; s<>e id., a pp ., 1Rl - 1R2.
Testimony of Ri cl1ard S. Scola ro, execu t ive director of the Joint
Committee on R eapportionment, at hcn r ing on pla intiff's motion for pn•,
liminary injun ction , ap1>., 106; ~c·r 510 F .
at .'H 7,
.
HJ

11

ict ,
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in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioners also
alleged that they were assigned to electoral districts solely
on the basis of race, and that this racial assignment diluted
their voting power in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.
Petitioners sought an injunction restraining New York officials from enforcing the new redistricting plan and a declaratory judgment that the Attorney General of the United
States had used unconstitutional and improper standards in
objecting to the 1972 plan.
On June 20, 1974, the District Court held a hearing on
petitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction. On July 1,
1974, the Attorney General informed the State of New York
that he did not object to the implementation of the revised
plan. The Attorney General moved to be dismissed as a
party on the ground that the relief sought against him could
be obtained only in the District Court for the District of
Columbia and only by a State or political subdivision subject
to the Voting Rights Act; the State and the intervenor
NAACP moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The District Court granted the motions to dismiss the complaint, reasoning that petitioners enjoyed no constitutional
right in reapportionment to separate community recogntion
as Hasidic Jews, that the redistricting did not disenfranchise
petitioners. and that racial considerations were permissible
to correct past discrimination.12 377 F. Supp. , at 1165-1166.
A divided Court of Appeals affirmed. The majority first
held that the Attorney General must be dismissed as a party
because the court had no jurisdiction to review his objection
to the 1972 plan?8 After agreeing with the District Court
12 PetitionPr~'

motions for a preliminary injunction and summary judgment were denied .
18 Although petitioners did not presrnt thiH queHtion for rcvirw , they
argue that the Attorney Grneral is properly [~ part? to this suit becausehe allegedly caused the state officials to deprive petitioners of their con~·
!!!ti.t~.tlonal rl~11ts. Bri ~f fqr Petitione ~ \ a t 53- 54, n. 22 ; Petition e r~' Rrpl:f
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think in racial terms"; because the Act "necessarily deals
with race or color, corrective action under it must do the
same." (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted.) The
court held that
"so long as a districting, even though based on racial
considerations, is in conformity with the unchallenged
directive of and has the approval of the Attorney General of the United States under the Act, at least absent
a clear showing that the resultant legislative reapportionment is unfairly prejudicial to white or nonwhite,
that districting is not subject to challenge." 510 F. 2d,
at 525.15
We granted certiorari, 423 U. S. 945 (1975).

We affirm.

II
Petitioners argue that the New York Legislature, although
seeking to comply with the Voting Rights Act as construed
by the Attorney General, has violated the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments by deliberately revising its reapportionment plan along racial lines. I.G In rejecting petitioners'
claims, we address four propositions: first, that whatever
15 The dissent would have found a constitutional violation in "the
drawing of district lines with a central and governing premise that a set
number of districts must have a predetermined nonwhite majority of
65% or more in order to ensure nonwl1ite control in those districts." The
dissent pointed out that neither the Attorney General nor the State of
New York would take responsibifity for the 65% "quota," and argued
that there was no showing of a pre-existing wrong which could justify the
use of a "presumptively odious" racial classification. 510 F. 2d, at 525,
526 (Frankel , J .).
w The Equal Protection Clau;:e. contnined in § 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment., forbid;; any St11te to '' deny to any person within its juri,:dirtion the equal protection of the laws." Section 1 of the Fifteenth
Amendment provide~; that " [t]ht> right of citizl."m; of the United State:; to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United Stat~ or by any State
on acco1Jlnt of race, color, or previous condition of servttude."
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might be true in other contexts, the use of racial criteria in
districting and apportionment is never permissible; second,
that even if racial considerations may be used to redraw dis~
trict lines in order to remedy the residual effects of past
unconstitutional reapportionments, there are no findings here
of prior discriminations that would require or justify as a
remedy that white voters be reassigned in order to increase
the size of black majorities in certain districts; third, that
the use of a "racial quota." in redistrictiug is never accept~
able; and fourth, that even if the foregoing general propo~
sitions are infirm, what New York actually did in this case
was unconstitutional, particularly its use of 65o/c nonwhite
. racial quota for certain districts. The first three arguments,
as we now explain, are foreclosed by our cases construing and
sustaining the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act; the
fourth we address in Parts III and IV.
It is apparent from the face of the Act, from its legislative history, and from our cases that the Act was itself
broadly remedial in the sense that it was "designed by Congress to banish the blight of racial discrimination in
voting .... " South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301,
308 ( 1966). It is also plain, however, that after "repeatedly
try[ing] to cope with the problem by facilitating case-by-case
litigation against voting discrimination," id., at 313, Congress
became dissatisfied with this approach, which required judicial findings of unconstitutional discrimination in specific
situations and judicially approved remedies to cure that discrimination. Instead. Congress devised more stringent meas~
ures, one of which, § 5, required the covered States to seek
the approval of either the Attorney General or of a threejudge court in the District of Columbia whenever they sought
to implement new voting procedures. Under ~ 4, a State
1became subject to ~ 5 whenever it was administratively determined that certain conditions which experience had proved
,were indicative of racial discriminatio11. in voting had existed._
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in the area-in the case of New York, as already indicated,
p. 2, supra, that a literacy test was in use in certain counties in
1968 and that fewer than 50% of the voting age residents in
these counties voted in the Presidential election that year. At
that point. New York could have escaped coverage by undertaking to demonstrate to the appropriate court that the test
had not been used to discriminate within the past 10 years, an
effort New York unsuccessfully made. See n. 3, supra.
Given this coverage of the counties involved. it is evident
that the Act's prohibition against instituting new voting procedures without the approval of the Attorney General or the
three-judge District Court is not dependent upon proving
past unconstitutional apportionments and that in operation
the Act is aimed at preventing the use of new procedures
until their capacity for discrimination has been examined by
the Attorney General or by a court. Although recognizing
that the 11 stringent new remedies," including § 5, were 11 an
uncommon exercise of congressional power," we nevertheless
sustained the Act as a "permissibly decisive" response to "the (
extraordinary stratagem of contriving new rules of various
kinds for the sole purpose of perpetrating voting discrimination in the face of adverse federal court decrees. " South t
Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, 383 U . S., at 334-335 (footnote omitted).
It is also clear that under § 5, new or revised reapportionment plans are among those voting procedures, standards or
practices that may not be adopted by a covered State without the Attorney General or a three-judge court ruling that
the plan 11 does not have the purpose and will not have the
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account
of race or color." In Alle11 v. State Board of Elections,
supra, 011 which the Court of Appeals relied below, we held
that a change from district to at-large voting for county
supervisors had to be submitted for federal approval under
§ 5, because of the potential for a "dilution" of minority
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voting power which could ''nullify [its] ability to elect the
candidate of [its] choice .... " 393 U. 8., at 569. When it re•
newed the Voting Rights Act in 1970 and again in 1975,
Congress was well aware of the application of ~ 5 to redis~
tricting. In its 1970 extension, Congress relied on findings
by the United States Commission on Civil Rights that the
newly gained voting strength of minorities was in danger of
being diluted by redistricting plaus that divided miuority
communities among predominantly white districts.n In
1975, Congress was unmistakenly cognizant of this new phase
in the effort to eliminate votiug discrimination. Former
Attorney Genera1 Katzenbach testified that § 5 "has had its
broadest impact ... in the areas of redistricting and reapportionment," and the Senate and House reports recommend"ing the extension of the Act referred specifically to the Attor..
The findings of the Commission's 18-month study, contained in its
1968 report, Political Participation, at 21-39, were endorsed in a statement submitted in the course of the Senate debates by t€n out of seventeen Senat€ Judiciary Committee members, who proposed and succrssfully supported the critical amendment that extended § 5. The findings
were repeatedly referred to during the Senate and House hr.arings held
in 1969 and 1970 in connection with the extension. E. g., Hearings on
H. R. 4249, H. R . 5538, and Similar Proposals (Voting Rights Act. Ex9
tension) ' before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House CommitteP on the
Judiciary , 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 3-.4 (1969) (statement of Rep. McCulloch) ; id., at ·17 (testimony of Howard Glickstein, Acting Staff Director, United States Commission on Civil Rights); id., at 150 (testimony
' of Thomas E. Harris, Associate General Counsel, AFL-CIO); Hearings
on S. 818, S. 2456, etc. (Amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965)
before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Jucliciary, 9lst Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., 47 (1969) (testimony of Frankie Freeman, Member, United States Commi;;sion on Civil
Rights) ; id., at 132 (testimony of Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. , General Counsel,
·Leadership Conference on Civil Rights): id., a.t 427 (statement of Howar<l
' Glickst.ein); id., at 516--518 (testimony of Daviq Norman, Deputy Assist~
I\llt Attorm·~· General, Civil Rlf;ht;; D1v1s10n , ll . S Drpt. of Justice) .
17
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ney General's role in screening redistricting plans to protect
the opportunities for nonwhites to be elected to public office. 18
As the Court of Appeals understood the Act and our
decision in Allen, compliance with the Act in reapportionment cases would often necessitate the use of racial considerations in drawing district lines. That the Court of
Appeals correctly read the Act has become clearer from later
cases.
In Beer v. United States, 425 1J. S. 130 (1976), the Court
considered the question of what criteria a legislature reapportionment must satisfy under ~ 5 of the Voting Rights
Act to demonstrate that it does not have the "effect" of
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ment by carving out a large enough black majority in however j
many additional districts would be necessary to satisfy the
Beer test. There was division on the Court as to what a
State must show to satisfy § 5; but all eight Justices who
participated in the decision implicitly accepted the proposi.
tion that a State may revise its reapportionment plan to
comply with § 5 by increasing the percentage of black voters
in a particular district until it has produced a clear majority.
See 425 U. S .. at 141-142; id. , at 144 (WHITE, J., dissent~
in g) , 158-161 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Indeed. the plan
eventually approved by this Court in Beer was drawn with
the purpose of avoiding dilution of the black vote by attaining at least a 54 % majority of black voters in one district
while preventing a 901o concentration. See B eer v. United
States, app. 341-342.
The Court has taken a similar approach in applying § 5
to the extension of city boundaries through annexation.
Where the annexation has the effect of reducing the percentage of blacks in the city, the proscribed "effect" on voting
rights can be avoided by a post-annexation districting plan
which "fairly reflects the strength of the N r:gro community
as it exists after the annexation" and which "would afford
[itl representation reasonably equivalent to [itsj political
strength in the enlarged community." City of Richmond
v. United States, 422 U. S. 358, 370- 371 (1975) . Accord ,
City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021 (DC
1972) , aff'd, 410 U. S. 962 (1973). In City of Richmond,
the Court approved an annexation which reduced the proportion of blacks in the city from 52 ~,{ to 427o . because the post~
annexation ward system created four out of nine wards with
substantial black majorities of 64% . Had the redistricting
failed to "fairly reflect the strength of the Negro community," how·ever, it would follow from the Court's decision
that the Constitution would permit the city to modify its
plan by deliberately creating black majorities in a sufficient.
tmmber of wards to sati~fy statutory requirement&.
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Implicit in Beer and City of Richmond, then, is the proposition that the Constitution does not prevent a State subject
,to the Voting Rights Act from deliberately creating or preserving black majorities in pa.r ticular districts in order to
ensure that its reapportionment plan complies with § 5.
That proposition must be rejected and § 5 held unconstitutional to that extent if we are to accept petitioners' view that
racial criteria may never be used in redistricting or that they
may be used. if at all, only as a specific remedy for past
unconstitutional apportionments. We are unwilling to overturn our prior cases, however. Section 5, and its authorization for racial redistricting where appropriate to avoid
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color. are
constitutional. Contrary to petitioners' first argument,
neither the Fourteenth nor the Fifteenth Amendment mandates any per se rule against using racial factors in districting
and apportionment. Nor is petitioners' second argumen1 j..(_:
valid. The permissible use of racial criteria is not confine '1 -.S
to elin~iuating the effects of past discriminatory districting o
~. ~
apportwnment. 10
~
(...)
10 Prtitioners nlso insist tluLt , because the Attorney General concluded
not thnt the 1972 plan would ha.w a di,;criminator~· effect but only that
the Statr had failrd to drmonstratr that tlw plan would not have suelr
an rffrct, thrrr wa::< insufticirnt justification for racial rrdistricting. Thi:;·
argumrnt overlooks thr central role of the shift in burden of proof in
the congrrssional pffort to combat discriminatory voting laws. Our c~tse:,; ·
h:we upheld this shift. As we s~tid in South Carolina \'. Katzenbach.
su.pm, "Aft<'r enduring nefLrly a century of oystematic rrsistance to thr·
Fifteenth Amenclmrnt,, Congrrss might wrll drcidr to shift thE' advantage
of timr and inertia from the prrprtrator~ of thE' E'vils to thE' victim~ . "·
38:3 F. S., at :328. And in affirming thr issuance. of an injunction against
enforcement of a statr rrapportionmrut plan for which thr State had not·
drmon~tratrcl thr absenrr of :t discriminator~ · rffrct, the Court stntrd:
"It is well t>titablishPd that. in a drclar:ltor~· judgment action undrr
§ 5, thP plaintiff Statr hao thr burdrn of proof. Whnt thr Attornry
Genrral's regul11tion~ do is to pla.ce thr Hamr burden on thr submitting·
p11rt~· in n § 5 objection procE'clurr. . . . Any lrss stringrnt mrasurP
might wrll havP :~:rnderrcl tlw formal clPdaratory judgmrnt prorNlure u"
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Moreover, in the process of drawing black majority dis~
tricts in order to comply with ~ 5. the State must decide how
substantial those majorities must be in order to satisfy the
Voting Rights Act. The figure used in drawing the Beer
plan, for example, was 545fc of registered voters.~" At a
minimum and by definition, a "black majority district" must
be more than sorr black. But whatever the specific per~
centage, the State will inevitably arrive at it as a necessary
means to ensure the opportunity for the election of a black
representative and to obtain approval of its reapportionment
plan. Unless we adopted an unconstitutional construction of
§ 5 in Beer and City of Richmond, a reapportionment cannot
violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment merely because a State uses specific numerical quotas in establishing a
certain number of black majority districts. Our cases under
§ 5 stand for at least this much.

III
Having rejected these three broad objections to the use of
racial criteria in redistricting under the Voting Rights Act,
we turn to the fourth question, which is whether the racial
criteria New York used in this case-the revision of the 1972
plan to create 65% nonwhite majorities in two additional
senate and two additional assembly districts-were constitutionally infirm. We hold they are not, on two separate
grounds. The first is addressed in this Part III, the second
in Part IV.
The first ground is that petitioners have not shown, or
offered to prove, that New York did more than the Attorney
General was authorized to require it to do under the non~
retrogression principle of Beer, a principle that as we have
dead lett~r b~· making availablr to coverrd State, 11 far :;moother path
to clearance. '' GeoTgia Y. United States, 411 lJ, S. 526, 538 (19n).
(Footnote omitted.)
:2(1 See p. 14, supra,

75-104-0PINION
UNITED JEWISH

OHGANIZATION~

v. CARNEY

17

already indicated this Court has accepted as constitutionally
valid. Under Beer, the acceptability of New York's 1972
reapportionment for purposes of ~ 5 depends on the change
in nonwhite voting strength in comparison with the previous
apportionment, which occurred in 1966. Yet there is no evidence in the record to show whether the 1972 plan increased
or decreased the number of senate or assembly districts with
substautial nonwhite majorities of 657{. For all that petitioners haw alleged or proved, the 1H74 revisions may have
accomplished nothing more than the restoration of uomvhite
voting strength to 1966 levels.~' To be successful in their
constitutional challenge to the racial criteria used in New
York's revised plan. petition~ must show that minority voting
strength was increased in comparison with the 1966 apportionment; otherwise the challenge amounts to a constitutional attack on compliance with the statutory rule of
nonretrogression.
In the absence of any evidence regarding nonwhite voting
strength under the 1966 apportionment, the creation of substantial nonwhite majorities in approximately 30% of the
senate and assembly districts in Kings County was reasouably related to the constitutionally valid statutory mandate
of maintaining uonwhite voting strength. The percentage of
districts with nonwhite majorities was less than the percentage
of no11whites in the county as a whole (35% ). The size of the
nonwhite majorities in those districts reflected the need to tah
account of the substantial difference between the nonwhite
percentage of the total population in a district and the nonIt is trtte, of course, that Bee1· was decidPd a ftrt· pE'titiourrs movrd
for summar~ · judgmE'nt in the District Court and aftrr thr Comt of
Appt>als affirmrd thE' Di,.;trict Court '~ drnial of that motion and dismis&'ll
of tlw action . But whilr relying on Beer in this Court, petitioner~ take
-the position t.hnt thE're arr no disputed i;,;suE's of tlw fact and that thE>ir
motion for summary judgment should br gnmtrcl on the basis of the
present rt>cor<:t Prt.itiout>t:<' Heply Brirf, at 17 ; Tr. of Oral Arg., at i0-71~
21

~r
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white percentage of the voting age population. 22 Because. as
the Court said in Beer, the inquiry under ~ 5 focuses ultimately
on "the position of racial miuorities with respect to their effec~
tive exercise of the electoral franchise, 425 U. S., at 141,
the percentage of eligible voters by district is of great importance to that inquiry.:~ s In the redistricting plan approved in
Beer, for example. only one of the two districts with a black
population majority also ha.d a black majority of registered
voters. /d., at 142. We think it was reasonable for the
Attorney General to conclude in this case that a substan~
tia1 nonwhite population majority-in the vicinity of 65%would be required to achieve a uonwhite majority of eligible
voters.
: Petitioners have not shown that New York did more than
~ccede to a position taken by the Attorney General that was
authorized by our constitutionally permissible construction of
§ 5. New York adopted the 1974 plan because it sought to
comply with the Voting Rights Act. This has been its
primary defense of the plan, which was sustained OtJ that
basis by the Court of Appeals. Because the Court of Ap22
The NAACP, intervenor in this action, submitted census data. to the
Attorney General showing that roughly 75o/c of all whites in Kings
County but only about 55% of all nonwhites were eligible to vote. App.
2_64. The NAACP urged that dist.ricts without signific.ant nonwhite population majorities would not have nonwhite majorities among eligible
voters. See, e. g., app. 219 .
The statistical problems in es timating the nonwhite population of the
di::;trict;.; in thP 1972 plan provided an additional rea::;on for the Attorney
· Genera.] to a:;k for an increase in the ::;ize of the nonwhite majorities in
certain district;;. 'I11e legislat.ure Uf<Pd the higher of the two ::;ets of e_,; ti ~
mates, and thP actual nonwhite population may have bePn somewhat
· lower . Sw npp. 265.
:~a The regulation governing submi::;sions to the Attorne~· General for
review of redistricting plan~ undPr § 5 "::;trongly urges" the ::;ubmitting
atlthorit·:v to include
v l oting-agc• population and the number of rcgiste.red voterr( brfore and after the change, by race. for the nrea to b~
affected by th~J change." 28 CFR § 51.10 (b) (6) (ii) (1976).

"r
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peals was essentially correct, its judgment may be affirmed
without addressing the additional argument by New York
1111d by the United States that. wholly aside from New York's
;obligation under the Voting Rights Act to preserve minority
voting strength in Kings County, the Constitution permits
it to draw district lines deliberately in such a way that the
, percentage of districts with a nonwhite majority roughly
approximates the percentage of nonwhites in the county.
IV
This additional argument. however. affords a second. and
independent, ground for sustaining the particulars of the
1974 plan for Kings County. Whether or not the plan was
authorized by or was in compliance with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. New York was free to do what it did as
long as it did not violate the Constitution , particularly the
Fourteenth and Fifteerith Amendments; and we are convinced that neither Amendment was infringed.
There is no doubt that in preparing the 1974. legislation,
the State deliberately used race in a purposeful manner.
But New York was seeking to comply with a federal statute
prohibiting racial discrimination in voting; its plan represented no racial slur or stigma with respect to whites or any
other race; and we discern no purposeful discrimination violative of the Fourtee nth Amendment or any abridgment of
the right to vote on account of race within the meaning of
the Fifteenth Amendment.
It is true that New York deliberately increased the nonwhite majorities in certain districts in order to el!_hance the
opportunity for election of nonwhite representatives from
those districts. Nevertheless, there was no fencing out of
the white population from participation in the political processes of the county, and the plan did not minimize or unfairly cancel out white voting strength. Compare White v.
Regester, 4.12 U. S. 755, 765--767 ( 1973) , and Gomillion v.
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Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960), with Gaffney v. CurnmingB,
412 U. S. 735, 751-754 ( 1973). Petitioners have not objected
to the impact of the 1974 plan on the representation of white
voters in the county or in the State as a whole. As the
Court of Appeals observed , the plan left white majorities in
approximately 70f, of tlw assembly and senate districts in
Kings CoUI1ty, which had a countywide population that was
65o/t- white. Thus, even if voting in the county occurred
strictly according to race. whites would not be underrepre~
sented relative to their share of the population.
In individual districts where nonwhite majorities were
increased to approximately 65 o/r , it became more likely. given
racial bloc voting, that black candidates would be_ elected
instead of their white oppm1ents, and it became less likely
that white voters would be represented by a member of
their own race; but as long as whites in Kings County, as a
-group. were provided with fair representation. we cannot conclude that there was a cognizable discrimination against
whites or an abridgement of their right to vote on the grounds
of race.2 ' Furthermore. the individual voter in the district. \
. with a nonwhite majority has no constitutional complaint I
merely because his candidate has lost out at the polls and his
district is represented by a person for whom he did not vote.
Some candidate. along with his supporters. always loses. See
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124. 153- 160 (1971) .
Where it occurs, voting for or against a candidate because

~·We al:;o note that the white voter who ns a result of the 19i4J
plan is in n district more lik(·)~· to return n nonwhite rPpresentntive will '
N 'Z) - t::Lt
be re resented , to the extent. that voting continues to follow racial line-: , -•
.t a. ~~ ....
bYJegislator;; elected from majority whitE' districts. The effect of the · ~
renpportionment on whitf'S in districts where nonwhite majorities have · en··~~ ~ .o-t
<7V'...., "'· ~~
bet>n increased is thus mitigatt>d by the pr«'servation of white majority
~ ~ ~ (til1'~
districts in the rest of the county. See I\'ote, 25 Stan. L. Rev. 84, 8-i· /'...P J
( 1972) . Of course, if voting doC's not follow racial lines, the white voter • ~~ ;,_ ...._,. ~~. • ...., ~
has !itt!<> reason to complain that the percentage of nonwhih•s in his:: - ~ ~ ..J
dj:strict has been increased,.
.L ""
Ll"""J._;..). ~
vcQ
.
~· -~ -..4~ tJ
tyv'-P'

~

.... ¥

~'
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of his race is an unfortunate practice. But it is not rare;
. and in any district where it regularly happens, it is unlikely
that any candidate wil1 be elected who is a member of the
race that is in the minority in that district. However
. disagreeable this result may be. there is no authority for the
proposition that the candidates who are found racially unacceptable by the majority, and the miuority voters supporting
those candidates, have had their Fourteenth or Fifteenth
Amendment rights infringed by this process. Their position
is similar to that of the Democratic or Republican minority
that is submerged year after year by the adherents to the
majority party who tend to vote a straight party line.
It does not follow, however. that the State is powerless
to minimize the consequences of racial discrimination by
voters when it is regularly practiced at the polls. In Gaffney
v. Cumntings, supra, the Court upheld a districting plan
"drawn with the conscious intent to ... achieve a rough
approximation of the statewide political strengths of the
Democratic and Republican Parties." 412 U. S., at 752.
We there recognized that districting plans would be vulnerable under our cases if "racial or political groups have been
fenced out of the political process and their voting strength
invidiously minimized." Id., at 754 (emphasis added); but
that was not the case there, and no such purpose or effect
may be ascribed to New York's 1974 plan. Rather, that plan
can be viewed as seeking to alleviate the consequences of
racial voting at the polls and to achieve a fair allocation of
political power betweeu white and nonwhite voters iu Kings·
County.
In this respect New York's revision of certain district lines·
is little different in kind from the decision by a State in
which a racial minority is unable to elect representatives·
from multimember districts to change to single-member dis-·
~ricting for the purpose of increasing minority representation.
'This change mi~ht sub~tantially increase minority repre-·
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sentation at the expense of white voters, who previously
elected all of the legislators but with single-member districts
could elect no more than their proportional share. If this
intentional reduction of white voting power would be constitutiona.Uy permissible, as we think it. would be. we think it
also permissible for a State, employing sound districting principles such as compactness and population equality, to attempt to prevent racial minorities from being repeatedly out. voted by creating districts that will afford fair representation
to the members of those racial groups who are sufficiently
numerous a.nd whose residential patterns afford the opportu. nity of creating districts iu which they will be in the
majority.
As the Court said in Gaffney,
"(C]ourts have [no] constitutional warrant to invalidate
a statto plan. otherwise within tolerable population limits,
because it undertakes, not to minimize or eliminate the
political strength of any group or party, but to recognize
it and. through districting. provide a rough sort of proportional representa.tiou in the legislative halls of the
State." Ibid.
New York was well within this rule when , under the circumstances present in Kings County, it amended its 1972
plan in au effort to comply with the Voting Rights Act prohibition against "denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color." u ;
The judgment is
Affirmed.

~ PE>titioners seE'k to distingui:::h Gaffney on thE' ground that Nt>w
York'8 usE' of racial critt>ria. was not the product of " reas01wd choice'~
by the statE' legislature but rather was coE>rced by federal officials. But
we do not think that thi;; otherwi:;e constitutionally f)('1'111issiblc plan.
was rl'lldl'red unconstitutional ml'rely becausl' New York adopt<"d it t01
~;omply with a f(~_l'ral stah).tc,
2
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Dear Byron:
As one moves from Part I through Part IV of your third
draft of this opinion, the Voting Rights Act undergoes much
the same metamorphosis as did the Cheshire cat. This suits
me fine, and if you could see your way clear to adopt the
following suggestions, or their substance, so as to do away
with even the grin in Part IV, I will join Parts I and IV.
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In the second full paragraph on page 19 omit the
reference to the fact that "New York was seeking to comply
with the federal statute prohibiting racial discrimination
J.n voting."
On page 22, omit the reference in the last full sentence
"to comply with the Voting Rights Act prohibition against
'denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race
or color.', and replace it with some sort of language such
as "accomplish such a result".
Sincerely,
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On Writ of Certiorari to thtl
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v.
peals for the Second Circuit,
Hugh L. Carey et al.

[December -, 1976]
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, concurring.
I join Parts I, II, and III of Mr. JuSTICE WHITE's opinion.
Part II effectively demonstrates that prior cases firmly establish the Attorney General's expansive authority to oversee
legislative redistricting under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
See, e. g., Georgia. v .. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 532 (1973);
Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 566, 569
(1969). Part III establishes to my satisfaction that as a
method of securing compliance with the Voting Rights Act,
the 65% rule applied to Brooklyn in this instance was not
arbitrarily or casually selected. Yet, because this case carries us further down the road of race-centered remedial
devices than we have heretofore traveled- with the serious
questions of fairness that attend such matters- ! offer this
further explanation of my position.
The one starkly clear fact of this case is that an overt
racial number was employed to effect petitioners' assignment
to voting districts. In brief, following the Attorney General's refusal to certify the 1972 reapportionment under his
§ 5 powers, unnamed Justice Department officials made known
that satisfaction of the Voting Rights Act in Brooklyn would
necessitate creation by the state legislature of 10 state Assembly and Senate districts with threshold nonwhite populations of 657'o.. Proml_)ted by the ne~ssit:y of preventing
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interference with the upcoming 1974 election, state officials
complied. Thus, the Justice Department's unofficial instruction to state officials effectively resulted in an explicit
process of assignment to voting districts pursuant to race.
The result of this process was a cow1~-wide pattern
of districting closely approximating proportional representation. While it is true that this demographic outcome did
not "underrepresent the white population" throughout the
county, ante, a.t 8,-indeed, the very definition of proportional representation precludes either under- or over-representation-these particular petitioners filed suit to complain
that they have been subjected to a process of classification
on the basis of race that adversely altered their status.
If we were presented here with a classification of voters
motivated by racial animus, City of Richmond v. United
States, 422 U. S. 358, 378 ( 1975); Wright v. Rockefeller,
376 U. S. 52, 58 (1964); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S.
339, 347 ( 1960), or with a classification that effectively
downgraded minority participation in the franchise , Georgia
v. United States, supra, 411 U. S., at 534; Whitcomb v.
Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 144 (1971), we promptly would
characterize the resort to race as "suspect" and prohibit
its use. Under such circumstances, the ta.i nted apportionment process would not necessarily be saved by its proportional outcome, for the segregation of voters into "separatebut equal" blocs still might well have the intent or effect
of diluting the voting power of minority voters. See, e. g.,
City of Richmond v. United States, supra, 422 U. S., at 378;
Wright v. Rockefeller, supra, 376 U. S., at 53-54; infra, at 5.
It follows. therefore, that if the racial redistricting involved
here, imposed with the avowed intention of clustering together 10 viable nonwhite majorities at the expense of preexisting white groupings, is not similarly to be prohibited, the
distinctiveness that avoids this prohibition must arise from
~~~het or both of twQ ~Qnsideratious: the permissibility of
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affording preferential treatment to disadvantaged nonwhites
generally, or the particularized application of the Voting
Rights Act in this instance.
The first and broader of the two plausible distinctions
rests upon the general propriety of so-called benign discrimination: the challenged race assignment may be permissible because it is cast in a remedial context with respect
to a disadvantaged class rather than in a setting that aims
to demean or insult any racial group. Even in the absence
of the Voting Rights Act, this preferential policy plausibly
could find expression in a state decision to overcome nonwhite disadvantages in voter registration or turnout through
redefinition of electoral districts-perhaps, as here, through
the application of a numerical rule--in order to achieve a
proportional distribution of voting power. Such a decision,
in my view, raises particularly sensitive issues of doctrine and
policy. 1 Unlike Part IV of MR. JusTICE WHITE's opinion, I
Part IV limits its endorsement of proportional distribution of voting
power to instances where the voters arl:' polarized along racial lines and
where the State intk'nds "no racial slur or stigma with respect to" any
race. Ante, at 19. I a!Iree that without such qualifications, the position
taken in Part IV plainly would be intolerable. Yet, even as so limited,
problems remain that, in my view, merit further consideration. For example, questions concerning the polarization of voters and the motives of
the state policymakers may place formidnble factfinding responsibilities
on the courts. Such responsibilities, I believe, are greatly lessened when
the Voting Rights Act is involved. See infra, at 8. Furthermore, I am
not at. rest with the notion that a "cognizable discrimination" cannot be
found so long as whites "as a group rare] provided with fair representation . . . . " Ante , at 20. While voting may differ from other activitieR
or entitlements in that one group of voters often derives benPfits indirectly from a legislator serving a different constituency-and to that
Pxtent I agree that the adverse effl'cts of a racial division arE' "mihgated,"
compare ante, at 20 n. 24 with infra, at ll-I am not ;satisfied that
this vicarious benefit fullr answers the Hasidim's romplaint of injustice.
Finally, I have serious doubt;; that the Court's acceptance of political11arty apportiomnl'nt in Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735, 751-754
1
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am wholly content to leave this thorny question until another
day, for I am convinced that the existence of the Voting
Rights Act makes such a decision unnecessary and alone
suffices to support an affirmance of the judgment before us.
I begin with the settled principle that not every remedial
use of race is forbidden. For example, we have authorized
and even required race-conscious remedies in a variety of
corrective settings. See, e. g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 25 (1971); United
States v. Montgomery Board of Education, 395 U. S. 225
(1969); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 44 U. S. L. W.
4356, 4363 ( 1976); ante, at 14. Once it is established that
circumstances exist where race may be taken into account in
fashioning affirmative policies/ we must identify those cir,
cumstances, and, further, determine how substantial a reliance may be placed upon race. If resort to the 65o/r rule
involved here is not to be sanctioned, that must be because
the benign use of such a binding numerical criterion (under
the Voting Rights Act) generates problems of constitutional
dimension that are not relevant to other, previously tolerated

nece·s11ril~·

(1973),
applies io apportionment by race. Politic11l affiliation is the hystone of the political trade. Race. ideally, is not.
~Of course, it could be suggested that the remedial rules upheld in
these earlirr cases acquired added legitimacy bec11use they arose in tht>
form of judicial decrees rather th11n affirmative legislative or executive
action. Arguably, a court-impm;fld remrdy to correct 11 ripe finding of discrimination should be accorded particular rr.spect. Yet, the role of the
judici:uy is not, decisive. First, as is the case here, even a legislative
policy of rcmrdial action can be closely t.ied to prior discriminatory
practices or patterns. See infra, at 10. Second. many of the criticisms
di cussed below that commonly are le\'cled aga.inst the benign usc of racial
remedies--e. IJ., t110 potential for arousing race consciousness 11nd the likelihood of imposing disproportionate burdens ~f compliance 'Upon relatively
J'innocent" whites-remain relevant regardless of the decisionmaker whQ\
imposes the remedial regime. I believe, theTefore, that the history of
equitable decrees 'l'ltilizing racial criteria fairly establishes tbe broad prin-.
.ciplt> that race may ~lay a legitimate role in remedial policle!'!.

I-:-
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race-conscious remedies. As a focus for consideration of what
these problems might or might not be, it is instructive to
consider some of the objections frequently raised to the use
of overt preferential race assignment practices.
First, a purportedly preferential race assignment may in fact
disguise a policy that perpetuates disadvantageous treatment of
the plan's supposed beneficia.ries. Accordingly, courts might
face considerable difficulty in ascertaining whether a given race
classification truly furthers benign rather than illicit objectives.
An effort to achieve proportional representation, for example,
might be aimed at aiding a group's participation in the political
processes by guaranteeing safe political offices, or, on the
other hand, might be a "contrivance to segregate" the group,
Wright v. Rockefeller, supra, 376 U. S., at 58, thereby
frustrating its potentially successful efforts at coalition build- I ~,V,
ing across racial lines. Compare, e. g., the positions of The Y V
black pla.intiffs in Wright, at 53-54, with the black intervenors, id., at 62 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Indeed, even the
present case is not entirely free of complaints that benignity
is not the true characteristic of the remedial redistricting.
Puerto Rican groups, for example, who have been joined
with black groups to establish the "nonwhite" category,
protested to the Attorney General that their political
strength under the 1974 reapportionment actually is
weaker than under the invalidated 1972 districting. Appendix, at 295. A black group similarly complained of the loss
of a "safe" seat because of the inadequacy of the 65 %
minimum figure. !d., at 296-297. These particular objections. as the Attorney General argued in his memorandum
endorsing the 1974 reapportionment, may be ill advised and
unpersuasive. Nevertheless, they illustrate the risk that
what is presented as an instance of benign race assignment in fact may prove to be otherwise. This concern, of
course, does not undercut the theoretical legitimacy or usefulne.s.s of preferential policies. At the minimum, however, it

,
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does suggest the need for careful consideration of the
operation of any racial device, even one cloaked in preferential ga.rb. And if judicial detection of truly benign policies
proves impossible or excessively crude, that alone might
warrant invalidating any race-drawn line.
Second, even in the pursuit of remedial objectives, an
explicit policy of assignment by race may serve to stimulate
our society's la.tent race consciousness, suggesting the utility
and propriety of basing decisions on a factor that ideally
bears no relationship to an individual's worth or needs.
See, e. g., Kaplan, Equal Justice in a.n Unequal World:
Equality for the Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U. L. Rev. 363, 379-380 (1966). Furthermore, even preferential treatment may act to stigmatize
its recipient groups, for although intended to correct systemic or institutional inequities, such a policy may imply
to some the recipients' inferiority and especial need for
protection." Again, these matters would not necessarily
speak against the wisdom or permissibility of selective, benign
racial classifications. But they demonstrate that the considerations that historically led us to treat race as a constitutionally "suspect" method of classifying individuals are
not entirely vitiated in a preferential context.
Third, especially when interpreting the broad principles
embraced by the Equal Protection Clause, we cannot well
ignore the social reality that even a benign policy of assignment by race is viewed as un,just by many in our society, ·
especially by those individuals who are adversely effect<'d·
a This phenomenon seems to have arisen with rrspect to policies affording preferential trent mont to women: thus groups dedicated to advancing ·
the legal position of women have appeared before this Court to challenge·
stn,tutes that facially offer advantage::; to women and not men. See, e. g.,
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U. S. 351 (1974) . This strategy, one surmises, can
be explained on the basis that even good-faith policit'S favoring women
may serve to highlight stereotypes concerning their supposed dependency:·
~t)d. llell!lcssness_.
·
·
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by a given classification. This impression of injustice may
be heightened by the natural consequence of our governing
processes that the most "discrete and insular" of whites often
will be called upon to bear the immediate, direct costs of
benign discrimination. See e. g., Kaplan , supra, at 373.--374;
cf. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination , 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723, 737-738 (1974). Perhaps not
surprisingly, there are indications that this case affords an example of just such decisionmaking in operation. For exam·
ple, the intervenor NAACP ta.kes pains to emphasize that
the mandated 65% rule could have been attained through
redistricting strategies that did not slice the Hasidic commu.
nity in half. State authorities, however, chose to localize
the burdens of race reassignment upon the petitioners rather
than to redistribute a more varied and diffused range of
whites into predominantly nonwhite districts. NAACP
Brief, at 29-31. I am in no position to determine the ac·
curacy of this appraisal, but the impression of unfairness is
magnified when a coherent group like the Hasidim disproportionately bears the adverse consequences of a race assignment
policy.
In my view, when a decisionmaker embarks on a policy
of benign racial sorting, he must weigh the concerns that
I have discussed against the need for effective social policies
promoting racial justice in a society beset by deep-rooted
racial inequities. But I believe that Congress here adequately struck that balance in enacting the carefully conceived remedial scheme embodied in the Voting Rights Act.
However the Court u1timately decides the constitutional
legitimacy of "reverse discrimination " pure and simple, I am
convinced that the application of the Voting Rights Act sub.
stantially minimizes the objections to preferential treatment,
and legitimates the use of even overt, numerical racial devices·
in electoral redistricting.
The participtttiQn of the Attorney General, for example,.
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largely relieves the judiciary of the need to grapple with the
difficulties of distinguishing benign from malign discrimination. Under § 5 of the Act, the Attorney General in effect
is constituted champion of the interests of minority voters,
and accompanying implementing regulations ensure the
availability of materials and submissions necessary to discern the true effect of a proposed reapportionment plan.
See 28 CFR § 51.19. This initial right of review, coupled
with the fact-finding competence of the Justice Department,
substantially reduces the likelihood that a complicated reapportionment plan that silently furthers malign racial policies would escape detection by appropriate officials. As a
practical matter, therefore, I am prepared to accord considerable deference to the judgment of the Attorney General
that a pa.rticula.r districting scheme complies with the remedial objectives furthered by the Voting Rights Act.
Similarly, the history of the Voting Rights Act provides
reassurance that, in the face of the potential for reinvigorating racial partisanship, the congressional decision to authorize the use of race-oriented remedies in this context was
the product of substantial and ca.reful deliberations. Enacted following "voluminous legislative" consideration , South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 , 309 (1966), the Voting
Rights Act represents an unequivocal and well-defined congressional consensus on the national need for "sterner and
more elaborate measures," ibid. , to secure the promise of
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments with respect
to exercise of the franchise. Insofar as the drawing of
district lines is a process that intrinsically involves numerical calculations, and insofar as state officials charged
with the task of defining electoral constituencies are unlikely
simply to close their eyes to considerations such as race and
national origin/ the resort to a numerical racial criterion M
It would be naive to suppA that racial considerations do not enter
•into u;p portionment decisiow. A variety of motiva tions could produ c~
4
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a method of securing compliance with the aims of the Voting Rights Act is, in my view, consistent with that consensus. Whatever may be the indirect and undesirable countereducational costs of employing such far-reaching racial
devices, Congress had to confront these considerations before
opting for an activist race-conscious remedial role supervised by federal officials. The "insidious and pervasive" evil
of voting rights violations, id., at 309, and the "specially informed legislative competence" in this area, Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 656 (1966); cf., Morton v. Mancari,
417 U. S. 535, 555 (1974), argue in support of the legitimacy
of the federal decision to permit a broad range of raceconscious remedial techniques, including, as here, outright
assignment by race.
This leaves, of course, the objection expressed by a
variety of participants in this litigation: that this reapportionment worked the injustice of localizing the direct burdens of racial assignment upon a mora.lly undifferentiated
group of whites," and, indeed, a group that plausibly is
peculiarly vulnerable to such injustice. This argument has
·both normative and emotional appeal, but for a variety of
such a reliance upon race: e. g., the desire to injure a race, a conscious
decision to distribute voting power among a variety of well-defined racial
and ethnic groilps or neighborhoods, or an attempt to employ race as a
proxy for political affiliation. Cf. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735,
753-754 (1973). The relative difficulty of isolating these motivations in
this closeted decisionmaking context, and the further difficulty of drciding
which of these motives sl1ould be permissible given the realities of the
apportionment process, undoubtedly explains § 5's prohibition of pmctices
that either "have the purpose . . . [or) effect of denying or abridging
the right to vote on account of race or color ... ·."
5 I find nothing in the record to suggest-and such a proposition seems
implausible-that the Hasidim bear any unique responsibility for the
decisions that led to discriminatory voting practices or effects in Brooklyn. Nor is there any contention that petitioners derived special benefits
from the prior discriminatory policies, other than to the extent that the
'oVerall white voice county-wide was strrngthrncd.
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reasons I am convinced that the Voting Rights Act drains
it of vitality.
First, it is important to recall that the Attorney General's
oversight focuses upon jurisdictions whose prior practices
exhibited the purpose or effect of infringing the right to vote
on account of race, thereby triggering § 4 of the Act, 42
U. S. C. § 1973 (b). This direct nexus to localities with
a history of discriminatory practices or effects enhances the
legitimacy of the Attorney General's remedial authority u over
individuals within those communities who benefited (as
whites) from those earlier discriminatory voting patterns.
Moreover, the obvious remedial nature of the Act and its
enactment by an elected Congress that hardly can be viewed
as dominated by nonwhite representatives belies any possibility that the decisionmaker intended a racial insult or
injury to those whites who are adversely affected by the
operation of the Act's provisions. 7 Finally, petitioners have
not been deprived of their right to vote, a consideration that
minimizes the detrimental impact of the remedial racial policies governing the § 5 reapportionment. True, petitioners·
6 It i.
true that. invoking jurisdiction under the Voting Rights Act
doPS not require an actual finding of purposeful discrimination. _

~ Nonetheless, as Mr. JusTICE WHITE's opinion notes, Congre~s
enacted the Act with "broadly remedial" objective;; in mind, ante, at 10,
and the conditions that activtlte § 4 are those " which rxperience had
proved were indicative of racial discrimination in voting," id ., at 10-11.
Indeed, these discriminatory effects often would afford probative evidence
of purposeful discrimination. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., - - U. S. - -, - - (1976).
7 In this regard, it is important that , notwithstanding the worrisome
suggest.ions of the intervenor, supra, iii 7, petitioners themselves do·
not protest that their treatment under thr 1974 plan WiiS motivatrd by
anti-semitism. See, e. g .. Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidis- .
<'rimination Principle, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 17 (1976). Indeed, it is undeni- .
able that the Hilsidic communlt~· is contiguous to several nonwhite neighborhoods, and, therefore, under~tandably is a candidatr for redistricting;
givrn the gonl of creating 10 viable nonwhite voting mnjorities ..
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are denied the opportunity to vote as a group in accordance
with the earlier districting configuration, but they do not press
any legal claim to a group voice as Hasidim. Petitioners
Brief, at 6 n. 6. In terms of their voting interests, then, the
burden that they claim to suffer must be attributable solely to
their relegation to increased nonwhite-dominated districts.
Yet, to the extent that white and nonwhite interests and sentiments are polarized in Brooklyn, the petitioners still are
indirectly "protected" by the remaining white Assembly and
Senate districts within the county, carefully preserved in
accordance with the white proportion of the total county
population. While these considerations obviously do not
satisfy petitioners, I am persuaded that they reinforce the
legitimacy of this remedy.
Since I find nothing in the first three parts of Mr. JusTICE
WHITE's opinion that is inconsistent with the views expressed
herein, I join those parts.
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MR. JusTICE WHITE announced the judgment of the Court
and filed an opinion, all of which is joined by MR. JusTICE
STEVENS, Parts I, II, and III of which are joined by MR.
,JusTICE BRENNAN and MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN, and Parts I
and IV of which is joined by MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST.
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits a state or
political subdivision subject to § 4 of the Act from implementing a legislative reapportionment unless it has obtained
·a declaratory judgment from the District Court for the District of Columbia, or a ruling from the Attorney General
of the United States, that the reapportionment "does not
have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying
or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color... •" 1
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, provides in
pertinent part:
'"Whenever . . . a State or political subdivision with respect to which
the prohibitions set forth in section 1973b (a) of this title based upon
determinations made under the second sentence of section 1973b (b) of
this title are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualifiea.tion or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with
respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1,
1968, ... such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory'
,judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or _pro1

/~
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The question presented· is whether, in the circumstances of
this case, the use of racial criteria by the State of New York
in its attempt to comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights
Act and to secure the approval of the Attorney General
violated the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment.
I
Kings County, N. Y., together with New York (Manhattan) and Bronx Counties, became subject to §§ 4 and 5
of the Act, by virtue of a determination by the Attorney
General that a literacy test was used in these three counties
as of November 1, 1968; and a determination by the Director
of the Census that fewer than 50% of the voting-age residents
of these three counties voted -in the presidential election of
1968. 2 Litigation to secure exemption from the Act was
unsuccessful/ and it became necessary for New York to
cedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying
or abridging the right to vot.e on account of race or color, and unless and
until the court enters such judglllent no person shall be denied the right
to vote for failure to comply with ·such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite,
standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced without such proceeding
if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has
been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of
such State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney
General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such
submission, except that neither the Attorney General's failure to object
nor a declaratory judgment entered under this section shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such qualification, prerequisite,
standard, practice, or procedure. Any action under this section shall be
heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with
the provisions of section 2284 of Title 28 and any appeal shall lie to
the Supreme Court."
A legislative reapportionment is a "standard, practice, or procedure with
respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1,
1968," within the meaning of § 5. See pp. 11-12, ·infra.
2 See 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (b) .
8 The State of New York brought an action to obtain a statutory
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secure the approval of the Attorney General or of the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia for its
1972 reapportionment statute insofar as that statute concerned Kings, New York, and· Bronx Counties. On January 31, 1974, the provisions of the statute districting these
counties for congressional, state senate, and state assembly
seats were submitted to the Attorney General. In accordance with the regulations governing his § 5 review, the Attorney General considered submissions from interested parties
criticizing and defending the plan. 4 Those submissions inexemption for the three counties under § 4 (a) of the Act, seeking a
declaratory judgment that its literacy test had not been used within the
10 years preceding the filing of the suit "for the purpose or with the
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
co.Ior." 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (a). After several years of litigation, the
District Court for the District of Columbia denied the exemption and
ordered the State to comply with the filing requirements of § 5. This
Court summarily affirmed. New York on Behalf of New York County v.
United States, 419 U. S. 888 (1974). See 510 F. 2d', at 516.
4
Section 51.19, 28 C. F. H.. provides:
"Section 5, in providing for submission to the Attorney General as an
alternative to seeking a declaratory judgment from the U. S. District
Court for the District of Columbia, imposes on the Attorney General
what is essentially a judicial function. Therefore, the burden of proof on
the submitting authority is the same in submitting changes to the Attorney General as it would be in submitting changes to the District Court
for the District of Columbia. The Attorney General shall base his decision
on a review of material presented by the submitting authority, relevant
informa.tion provided by individuals or groups, and the results of any
investigation conducted by the Department of Justice. If the Attorney
General is sa.tisfied that the submitted change does not have a racially
discriminatory purpose or effect, he will not object to the change and will
so notify the submitting authority. If the Attorney General determines
that the submitted change has a racially discriminatory purpose or effect,
he will enter an objection and will so notify the submitting authority.
If the evidence as to the purpose or effect of the change is conflicting,
and the Attorney General is unable to resolve the conflict within the
60-day period, he shall, consistent with the above-described burden of
proof applicable in the District Court, enter an objection and so notify
the submitting authority."

f
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eluded assertions that voting· in these counties was racially
polarized and that the district lines had been created with
the purpose or effect of diluting the voting strength of
nonwhites (blacks and Puerto Ricans). 5 On April 1, 1974,
the Attorney General concluded that, as to certain districts
in Kings County covering the Bedford-Stuyvesant area of
Brooklyn, the State had not met the burden placed on it
by § 5 and the regulations thereunder to demonstrate that
the redistricting had neither the purpose nor the effect of
abridging the right to vote by reason of race or color. 6
The record in this Court contains only part of the materials submitted
to and considered by the Attorney General in his review of the 1972 plan.
Included in the present record are a memorandum submitted on behalf
of the NAACP and letters from several prominent black and Puerto
Rican elected officials, all opposing the plan. Not included in the record
are materials defending the plan submitted by the reapportionment committee of the New York legislature, the state attorney general, and several state legislators. Brief for the United States, at 8, and n. 9.
The NAACP; the At,torney General, and the court below classified
Puerto Ricans in New York together with blacks as a minority group
entitled to Lhe protections of the Voting Rights Act. Hereinafter ,we
use the term "nonwhite" to refer to blacks and Puerto Ricans, although
small numbers of other nonwhite groups (such as orientals) are also
included in the nonwhite population statistics.
6 The basis for the Attorney General's conclusion that "the proscribed
effect may exist" as to certain state assembly and senate districts in Kings
County was explained in his letter to the New York state authorities as
follows:
''Senate district 18 appears to have an abnormally high minority concentration while adjoining minority neighborhoods are significantly diffused into surrounding districts. In the less populous proposed assembly
districts, the minority population appears to be concentrated into districts 53, 54, 55 and 56, while minority neighborhoods adjoining those
districts are diffused into a number of other districts. . . . [W]e know
of no necessity for such configuration and believe other rational alternatives exist."
The Attorney General also objected to the congressional districting in
Kings County and to the state legislative districting in New York County.
The districting for these seats is not at issue in this litigation.
5
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Under § 5, the State could have challenged the Attorney
Seneral's objections to the redistricting plan by filing a
declaratory judgment action in a three-judge court in the
District of Columbia. Instead, the State sought to meet
what it understood to be the Attorney General's objections
and to secure his approval in order that the 1974 primary
and general elections could go forward under the 1972
statute. 7 A revised plan, submitted to the Attorney General
on May 31, 1974, in its essentials did not cha.nge the number
of districts with nonwhite majorities, but did change the
size of the nonwhite majorities in almost aU of those districts.
Under the 1972 plan, Kings County had three state senate
districts with nonwhite majorities of approximately 91%,
61 7o, and 537o; under the revised 1974 plan, there were again
three districts with nonwhite majorities, but now all three
were between 70% and 75% nonwhite. 8 As for state assembly
districts, both the 1972 and the 1974 plans provided for
seven districts with nonwhite majorities. However, under
the 1972 plan, there were four between 85% and 95% nonwhite, and three were approximately 76%, 61%, and 52%,
7 The State was also under pressure from a private suit to compel
enactment of new district lines consistent with the views of t.he Attorney
General. NAACP v. New York City Board of Elections, SDNY 72 Civ.
1460. See 510 F. 2d, at 517 n. 6.
8 The 1972 percentages are taken from Table 3, accompanying the
memorandum in support of the motions to dismiss of the applicants for
intervention, record at 265, except for the 61% figure, which is for a
district only partially in Kings County. That figure is taken from the
Brief for the United States, at 53, and represents the black and Purrto
Rican population rather than all nonwhites . The 1974 percentages are
taken from the Interim Report of the .Joint Committee on Reapportionment, app., at 179-180.
The 197 4 plan created · nonwhite majorities in two state senate districts
that were ma,jority white under the 1972 plan (t.he 17th and the 23d),
but created white majorities in two districts that were majority nonwhite
under the 1972 plan (the 16th and . the 25th). See Brief for the United
States, at 53:
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respectively; under the 1974 plan, the two smallest nonwhi~
majorities were increased · to 65% and 67.5 %, and the two
largest nonwhite majorities were decreased from greater than
90% to between 80% and 90%.0 The report of the legislative committee on reapportionment stated that these changes
were made "to overcome Justice Department objections" by
creating more "substantial nonwhite majorities" in two as~mbly districts and two senate districts. 10
One of the communities affected by these revisions in the
Kings County reapportionment plan was the Williamsburgh
area, where about 30,000 Hasidic Jews live. Under the 1972
plan, the Hasidic community was located entirely in one
assembly district (61% nonwhite) and one senate district
(i37% nonwhite~ ) in order to create substantial nonwhite
majorities in these districts, the 1974 revisions split the
Hasidic community between two senate and two assembly
d;istricts. A staff member-of the legislative reapportionment
committee testified that in the course of meetings and telephone conversations with Justice Department officials, he
"got the feeling ... that 65 percent would be probably an
approved figure" for the nonwhite population in the assembly
d~strict in which the Hasidic community was located, a district approximately 61 7'o· nonwhite under the 1972 plan.11
To attain the 65 % figure, a portion of the white population,
including part of the Hasidic community, was reassigned to
aJl adjoining district.
Shortly after the State submitted this revised redistricting
ptan for Kings County to the Attorney General, petitioners
sued on behalf of the Hasidic Jewish community of Williams0 Table 3, supra, n. 8, app., 266 ; Interim Report, supra, n. 8, app.,
195; Brief for the United Sta.tes, app., at 54. See 510 F. 2d, at 523
n. 21.
~ 0 Interim Report , supra, n. 8, app., 179 ; see id., app., 181- 182.
11 Testimony of Richard S. Scolaro, executive director of the Joint
Committee on Reapportionment, at hearing on plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, app., 106; :see 510 F. 2d, at 517 .

75-104-0PINION
UNITED JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS v. CAREY

7

burgh, alleging that the 1974 plan "would dilute the value
of each plaintiff's franchise by halving its effectiveness," solely
for the purpose of achieving a racial quota and therefore
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioners also
alleged that they were assigned to electoral districts so·lely
on the basis of race, and that this racial assignment diluted
their voting power in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.
Petitioners sought an injunction restraining New York officials from enforcing the new redistricting plan and a declaratory judgment that the Attorney General of the United
States had used unconstitutional and improper standards in
objecting to the 1972 plan.
On June 20, 1974, the District Court held a hearing on
petitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction. On July 1,
1974, the Attorney General informed the State of New York
that he did not object to the implementation of the revised
plan. The Attorney General moved to be dismissed as a
party on the ground that the relief sought against him could
be obtained only in the District Court for the District of
Columbia and only by a State or political subdivision subject
to the Voting Rights Act; the State and the intervenor
NAACP moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The District Court granted the motions to dismiss the complaint, rea.soning that petitioners enjoyed no constitutional
right in reapportionment to separate community recogntion
as Hasidic Jews, that the redistricting did not disenfranchise
petitioners, and that racial considerations were permissible
to correct past discrimination.1 2 377 F. Supp., at 1165--1166.
A divided Court of Appeals affirmed. The majority first
held that the Attorney General must be dismissed as a party
because the court had no j'urisdiction to review his objection
12

Petitioners' motions for a preliminary injunction and summary judgment were denied.
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to the 1972 plan.13 After agreeing :with the District Court
that petitioners had no constitutional right to separate community recognition in reapportionment-a holding not challenged by petitioners here 14 -the Court of Appeals went on
to address petitioners' claims as white voters that the 1974
plan denied them equal protection of the laws and abridged
their right to vote on the basis of race. The court noted
that the 1974 plan left approximately 70% of the senate and
assembly districts in Kings County with white majorities~
given that only 65% of the population of the county was
white, the 1974 plan would not underrepresent the white
population, assuming that voting followed racial lines. 510
F. 2d., at 523, and n. 21. Petitioners thus could not claim
that the plan canceled out the voting strength of whites
as a racial group, under this Court's decisions in White
v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973), and Whitcomb · v. Chavis,
403 U. S. 124 (1971). The court then observed that the
case did not present the question whether a legislature,
"starting afresh," could draw lines on a racial basis so as to
bolster nonwhite voting strength, but rather the "narrower"
question whether a State could use racial considerations in
~rawing lines in an effort to secure the Attorney General's
approval under the Voting Rights Act. 510 F. 2d, a.t 524. The
court thought this question answered by this Court's decision
in Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544,569 (1969),
Although petitioners did not present this question for review, they
argue that the Attorney General is properly a party to this suit because
he allegedly caused the state officials to deprive petitioners of their constitutional rights. Brief for Petitioners, at 53-54, n. 22; Petitioners' Reply
Brief, at 5 n. 1. In view of our disposition of the case, we do not reach
this issue.
14
In their brief in this Court , petitioners state: "[We do notl contend
that there is any right-constitutional or statutory-for permanent recognition of a community in legislative apportionment. Our argument is,
r&-ther, that the history of the area demonstrates that there could b~
and in fact was-no reason other than race to divide the community at
this time." Brief for Petitioners, at 6 n. 6. · (Emphasis in original.)
18
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where a change from district to at-large voting for county
supervisors was held to be covered by § 5 of the Act. The
court below reasoned that the Act contemplated that the
Attorney General and the state legislature would have "to
think in racial terms"; because the Act "necessarily deals
with race or color, corrective action under it must do the
same." (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted.) The
court held that
"so long as a districting, even though based on racial
considerations, is in conformity with the unchallenged
directive of and has the approval of the Attorney General of the United States under the Act, at least absent
a clear showing that the resultant legislative reapportionment is unfairly prejudicial to white or nonwhite,
that districting is not subject to challenge." 510 F. 2d,
at 525. ~
1

We granted certiorari, 423 U. S. 945 (1975).

We affirm.

II

Petitioners argue that the New York Legislature, although
seeking to comply with the Voting Rights Act as construed
by the Attorney General, has violated the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments by deliberately revising its reapportionment plan along racial lines. 1 u In rejecting petitioners,
15 The dissent would have found a. constitutional violation in "the
drawing of district lines with a cent raJ and governing premise that a set
number of districts must have a predetermined nonwhite majority of
65% or more in order to ensure nonwhite control in those districts." The
dissent pointed out that neither the Attorney General nor the State of
New York would take responsibility for the 6S% "quota," and argued
that there was no showing of a pre-existing wrong which could justify the
·use of a "presumptively odious1' racial classification. 510 F. 2d, at 525,
526 (Frankel, J .).
10
The Equal Protection Clau~e. contained in § 1 of the Fourtrcnth
Amendment, forbids any State to '· deny to any prrson within its jurisclic·tibn the rqual protrrtion of the law,;." Srrtion 1 of the Fifteenth
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claims, we address four propositions: first, that whatever.
might be true in other contexts, the use of racial criteria if\
districting and apportionment is never permissible; second,.
that even if racial considerations may be used to redraw dis-.
trict lines in order to remedy the residual effects of past.
unconstitutional reapportionments, there are no findings here
of prior discriminations that would require or justify as a
remedy that white voters be reassigned in order to increase
the size of black majorities in certain districts; third, that
the use of a "racial quota" in redistricting is never accept-_
able; and fourth, that even if the foregoing general propo-.
sitions are infirm) what New York actually did in this case
was unconstiwtional, particularly its use of 65'fo nonwhite
racial quota for certain districts. The first three arguments,
as we now explain, are foreclosed by our cases construing and_
sustaining the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act; the
fourth we address in Parts III and IV.
It is apparent from the face of the Act, from its legislative history, and from our cases that the Act was itself
broadly remedial in the sense that it was "designed by Con:.
gress to banish the blight of racial discrimination in
voting . . . ." South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301,,
308 (1966). It is also plain , however, that after "repeatedly
try[ing] to cope with the problem by facilitating case-by-case;
litigation against voting discrimination ," id., at 313, Congress
became dissatisfied with this approach, which required judi:.
cial findings of unconstitutional discrimination in specific
situations and judicially approved remedies to cure that dis:.
crimina.tion. Instead. Congress devised more stringent meas:.
ures, one of which, § 5, required the covered States to seek
the approval of either the Attorney General or of a three:.
judge court in the District of Columbia whenever they sough~
Amendment provides t-hat " [t]hE' right of citiz E'n ~ of the Unit.f'd States t~
vote shall not be dcnied or abridged by thE' United Stat es or b~· any StatE'.
e.!l account of race, color, or previou · c~nd_it ion of llcn ·itude."
-
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to implement new voting procedures. Under § 4, a State
became subject to § 5 whenever it was administratively de.
termined that certain conditions which experience had proved
were indicative of racial discrimination in voting had existed
in the area-in the case of New York, as already indicated,
p. 2, supra, tha.t a literacy test was in use in certain counties in
1968 and that fewer than 50% of the voting age residents in
these counties voted in the presidential election that year. At
tha.t point, New York could have escaped coverage by undertaking to demonstrate to the appropriate court that the test
had not been used to discrimina.te within the past 10 years, an
effort New York unsuccessfully made. See n. 3, supra.
Given this coverage of the counties involved, it is evident
that the Act's prohibition against instituting new voting procedures without the approval of the Attorney General or the
three-judge District Court is not dependent upon proving
past unconstitutional apportionments and that in opera.tion
the Act is aimed at preventing the use of new procedures
until their capacity for discrimination has been examined by
the Attorney General or by a court. Although recognizing
that the "stringent new remedies," including § 5, were "an
uncommon exercise of congressional power," we nevertheless
sustained the Act as a "permissibly decisive" response to "the
extraordinary stratagem of contriving new rules of various
kinds for the sole purpose of perpetrating voting discrimination in the face of adverse federal court decrees." South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, 383 U. S., at 334-335 (footnote omitted).
It is also clear that under § 5, new or revised reapportionment plans are among those voting procedures, standards or
practices that may not be adopted by a covered State with·
out the Attorney General or a three-judge court ruling that
the plan "does not have the purpose and will not have the
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account
'Of race or color." In Allen v. State Board of Elections,
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supra, on which the Court of Appeals relied below, we held

.that a change from district to at-large voting for county
supervisors had to be submitted for federal approval under
§ 5, because of the potential for a "dilution" of minority
voting power which could "nullify [its] ability to elect the
candidate of [its] choice..., ." 393 U.S., at 569. When it renewed the Voting Rights Act in 1970 and again in 1975,
Congress was well aware of the application of § 5 to redistricting. In its 1970 extension, Congress relied on findings
by the United States Commission on Civil Rights that the
newly gained voting strength of minorities was in danger of
;being diluted by redistricting plans that divided minority
communities among predominantly white districts. 17 In
1975, Congress was unmistakenly cognizant of this new phase
in the effort to eliminate voting discrimination. Former
Attorney General Katzenbach testified that § 5 "has had its
broadest impact . . . in the areas of redistricting and reap17 The findings of the Commission's 18-month study, contained in its
1968 report, Political Participation, at 21-39, were endorsed in a statement submitted in the course of the Senate debates by ten out of seventeen Senate Judiciary Committee members, who proposed and successfully supported the critical amendment that extended § 5. The findings
were repeatedly referred to during the Senate and House hearings held
in 1969 and 1970 in connection with the extension. E. g., Hearings on
H. R. 4249, H. R. 5538, and· Similar Proposals (Voting Rights Act Extension) before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess:, 3:...4 (1969) (statement of Rep. McCulloch); id., at 17 (testimony of Howard Glickstein, Acting Staff Director, United States Commission on Civil Rights); id., at 150 (testimony
of Thomas E. Harris, Associate General Counsel, AFL-CIO); Hearings:
on S. 818, S. 2456, etc. (Amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965)
before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., 47 (1969) (testimony of Frankie Freeman, Member, United States Commission on Civil
Rights); id., at 132 (testimony of Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., General Counsel,
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights); id., at 427 (statement of Howar<l
Glickstein); id., at 516-518 (testimony of David Norman, Deputy Assist~tnt Attorney General, Civil Rights Divi&ion, U. S. Dept. of Justice).
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portionment," and the Senate and House reports recommend ..
, jng the extension of the Act referred specifically to the At tor..
ney General's role in screening redistricting plans to protect
the opportunities for nonwhites to be elected to public office. 18
As the Court of Appeals understood the Act and our
decision in Allen, compliance with the Act in reapportionment cases would often necessitate the use of racial considerations in drawing district lines. That the Court of
Appeals correctly read the Act has become clearer from later
cases.
In Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976) , the Court
considered the question of what criteria a legislature reap•
portionment must satisfy under § 5 of the Voting Rights
Act to demonstrate that it does not have the "effect" of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race.
Beer established that the Voting Rights Act does not permit
the implementation of a reapportionment that "would lead
to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with
respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise."
/d., at 141. This test was satisfied where the reapportionment increased the percentage of districts where members of
racial minorities protected by the Act were in the majority.
See ibid. But if this test were not met, clearance by the
Attorney General or the District Court for the District of
Columbia could not be given, and the reapportionment could
not be implemented.
The reapportionment a.t issue in Beer was approved by
this Court, because New Orleans had created one councilmani~
'district with a majority of black voters where none existed
before. But had there been districts with black majoriti~
under the previous law and had New Orleans in fact decreased the number of majority black districts, it would hav~
18 Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
'94th Cong., 1st Sess., 124 (1975) (testimony of Nicholas Katz enbach) ~
S. Rep. No. 94-295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. , 15-19 (1975) ; H . R. Rep. No:
'9~196 , 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 8-11 (1975) .
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had to modify its plan in order to implement its reapportionment by carving out a large enough black majority in however
many additional districts would be necessary to satisfy the
Beer test. There was division on the Court as to what a
State must show to satisfy § 5; but all eight Justices who
participated in the decision implicitly accepted the proposition that a State may revise its reapportionment plan to
comply with § 5 by increasing the percentage of black voters
in a particular district until it has produced a clear majority.
See 425 U. S., at 141- 142; id., at 14.4 (WHITE, J. , dissenting) , 158-161 (MARSHALL, J:, dissenting). Indeed, the plan
eventually approved by this Court in Beer was drawn with
the purpose of avoiding dilution of the bla,ck vote by attaining at least a 54% majority of black voters in one district
while preventing a 90% concentration. See B eer v. United
States, app. 341- 342.
The Court has taken a similar approach in applying § 5
to the extension of city boundaries through annexation.
Where the annexation has the effect of reducing the percentage of blacks in the city, the proscribed "effect" on voting
rights can be avoided by a post-annexation districting plan
which "fairly reflects the strength of the Negro community
M it exists after the annexation" and which "would afford
[it] representation reasonably equivalent to [its] political
strength in the enlarged community." City of Richmond
v. United States, 422 U. S. 358, 370- 371 (1975) . Accord,
City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F . Supp. 1021 (DC
1972), aff'd; 410 U. S. 962 (1973). In City of Richmond,
the Court approved an annexation which reduced the proportion of blacks in the city from 52% to 42%, because the postannexation ward system created four out of nine wards with
SJ.Ibstantial black majorities of 64%. Had the redistricting
failed to "fairly reflect the strength of the Negro community," however, it would follow from the Court's decision
that the Constitution would permit th e city to modify its
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plan by deliberately creating black majorities in a sufficient
number of wards to satisfy statutory · requirements.
Implicit in Beer and City of Richmond, then, is the propo·
sition that the Constitution does not prevent a State subject
to the Voting Rights Act from deliberately creating or preserving black majorities in particular districts in order to
ensure that its reapportionment plan complies with § 5.
That proposition must be rejected and § 5 held unconstitutional to that extent if we are to accept petitioners' view that
racial criteria may never be used in redistricting or that they
may be used, if at all, only as a specific remedy for past
unconstitutional apportionments. We are unwilling to over..
turn our prior cases, however. Section 5, and its authoriza•
tion for racial redistricting where appropriate to avoid
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, are
constitutional. Contrary to petitioners' first argument,
neither the Fourteenth nor the Fifteenth Amendment mandates any per se rule against using racial factors in districting
and apportionment. Nor is petitioners' second argument
valid. The permissible use of racial criteria is not confined
to eliminating the effects of past discriminatory districting or
apportionmen t. 19
19 Petitioners also insist that, because the Attorney General concluded
not that the 1972 plan would have a discriminatory effect but only that
the State had failed to demonstrate that the plan would not have such
an effect, there was insufficient justification for racial redistricting. This
argument overlooks the central role of the shift in burden of proof in
the congressional effort to combat discriminatory voting laws. Our cases
have upheld this shift. As we said in South Carolina v. Katzenbach.
supra, "After enduring nearly a century of systematic resistance to the
Fifteenth Amendment, Congress might well decide to shift the advantage
of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evils to th(' ,·ictims.''
383 U. S., at 328. And in affirming the issuance of an injunction against
enforcement of a state reapportionment plan for which the State had not
demonstrated the absence of a discriminatory effect, the Court stated:
"It is well established that in a declara.tory judgment action under
§."5, the plaintiff State has the burden of proof. What the Attorney
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Moreover, in the process of drawing black majority districts in order to comply with § ·5, the State must decide how
substantial those majorities must be in order to satisfy the
Voting Rights Act. The figure used ·in drawing the Beer
plan, for example, was 54o/o of registered voters. 20 At a
minimum and by definition, a "black majority district" must
be more than 50% black. But whatever the specific percentage, the State will inevitably arrive at it as a necessary
means to ensure the opportunity for the election of a black
representative and to obtain approval of its reapportionment
plan. Unless we adopted an unconstitutional construction of
§ 5 in Beer and City of Richmond, a reapportionment cannot
violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment merely because a State uses specific numerical quotas in establishing a
certain number of black majority districts. Our cases under
§ 5 stand for at least this much.

III ·
Having rejected these three broad objections to the use of
racial criteria in redistricting under the Voting Rights Act,
we turn to the fourth question, which is whether the racial
criteria New York used in this case-the revision of the 1972
plan to create 65% nonwhite majorities in two additional
senate and two additional assembly districts-were constitutionally infirm. We hold they are not, on two separate
grounds. The first is addressed in this Part III, the second
in Part IV.
The first ground is that petitioners have not shown, or
offered to prove, that New York did more than the Attorney
General's regulations do is to place the same burden on the submitting
party in a § 5 objection procedure. . . . Any less stringent measure
might well have rendered t he formal declaratory judgment procedure a
dead letter by making available to covered Stat es a far smoother path
to clearance." Georgia v. United States, 411 U. S. 526, 538 (1973),
(J[ootnote omitted .)
w See p. 14, supra.
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General was authorized to require it to do under the nonretrogression principle of Beer, a principle that as we have
already indicated this Court has accepted as constitutionally
valid. Under Beer, the acceptability of New York's 1972
reapportionment for purposes of § 5 depends on the change
in nonwhite voting strength in comparison with the previous
apportionment, which occurred in 1966. Yet there is no evidence in the record to show whether the 1972 plan increased
or decreased the number of senate or assembly districts with
substantial nonwhite majorities of 659fo. For all that petitioners have alleged or proved, the 1974 revisions may have
accomplished nothing more than the restoration of nonwhite
voting strength to 1966 levels." 1 To be successful in their
constitutional challenge to the racial criteria used in New
York's revised plan, petitioners must show at a minimum that
minority voting strength was increased under the 1974 plan
in comparison with the 1966 apportionment; otherwise the
challenge amounts to a constitutional attack on compliance
with the statutory rule of nonretrogression.
In the absence of any evidence regarding nonwhite voting
strength under the 1966 apportionment, the creation of substantial nonwhite majorit.ies in approximately 309fo of the
senate and assembly districts in Kings County was reasonably related to the constitutionally valid statutory mandate
of maintaining nonwhite voting strength. The percentage of
districts with nonwhite majorities was l('SS than the percentage
of nonwhites in the county as a whole (35 %•). The size of the
honwhite majorities in those districts reflected the need to take
21 It is true, of course, that Beer was decided after petitioners moved
for summary judgment in the District Court and after the Court of
Appeals affirmed the District Court's denial of that motion and dismissal
of the action . But while relying on Beer in this Court, petitioners take
the position that there are no disputed issues of the fact and that their
motion for summn.ry judgment should be granted on the basis of the
present record. Petitioners' Reply Brief, at 13-14, 17 ; Tr. of Oral Arg .,
at 70-71.

I
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account of the substantial difference between the nonwhite
percentage of the total population in a district and the nonwhite percentage of the voting age popula.tion. 22 Because, as
the Court said in Beer, the inquiry under§ 5 focuses ultimately
on "the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise, 425 U. S., at 141,
the percentage of eligible voters by district is of great impor..:
tance to that inquiry. 23 In the redistricting plan approved in
Beer, for example, only one of the two districts with a black
population majority also had a black majority of registered
voters. /d., at 142. We think it was reasonable for the
Attorney General to conclude in this case that a substantial nonwhite population majority-in the vicinity of 65%would be required to achieve a nonwhite majority of eligible
voters.
\ Petitioners have not shown that New York did more than
.accede to a position taken by the Attorney General that was
authorized by our constitutionally permissible construction of
§ 5. New York adopted the 1974 plan because it sought to
comply with the Voting Rights Act. This has been its
22
The NAACP, intervenor in this action, submitted census data to the
Attorney General showing that roughly 75% of all whites in Kings
County but only about 55% of all nonwhites were eligible to vote. App.
264. The NAACP urged that districts without significn.n t nonwhite popu~tion majorities would not have nonwhite majorities among eligible
voters. See, e. g., app. 219.
The statistical problems in estimating the nonwhite population of the
d,istricts in the 1972 plan provided an additional reason for the Attorney
General to ask for an increase in the size of the nonwhite majorities in
certain district-s. The legislature used the higher of the two $ets of estift
mates, and the actual nonwhite population may have been somewhat
lower. See app. 265.
23 The regulation governing submissions to the Attorney General for
review of redistricting plans under § 5 "strongly urges" the submitting
authority to include " [ v] oting-age population and the number of registered voters before and after the change, by race, for the area. to be
. affected by the change." 28 CFR § 51.10 (b) (6) (ii) ( 1976).
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primary defense of the plan, which was sustained on that
basis by the Court of Appeals. Because the Court of Appeals was essentially correct, its judgment may be affirmed
without addressing the additional argument by New York
and by the United States that, wholly aside from New York's
.obligation under the Voting Rights Act to preserve minority
voting strength in Kings County, the Constitution permits
it to draw district lines del!berately in such a way that the
percentage of districts with a nonwhite majority roughly
approximates the percentage of nonwhites in the county.

IV
This additional argument, however, affords a second, and
independent, ground for sustaining the particulars of the
1974 plan for Kings County. Whether or not the plan was
authorized by or was in compliance with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, New York was free to do what it did as
long as it did not viola.te the Constitution, particularly the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments; and we are convinced that neither Amendment was infringed.
There is no doubt that in preparing the 1974 legislation,
the State deliberately used race in a purposeful manner. But/
its plan represented no racial slur or stigma with respect to
whites or any other race, and we discern no discrimination violative of the Fourteenth Amendment or any abridgment of
the right to vote on account of race within the meaning of
the Fifteenth Amendment.
It is true that New York deliberately increased the nonwhite majorities in certain districts in order to enhance the
opportunity for election of nonwhite representatives from
those districts. Nevertheless, there was no fencing out of
the white population from participation in the political processes of the county, and the plan did not minimize or unfairly cancel out white voting strength. Compare White v.
Re(Jester, 412 U. S. 755, 765-767 ( 1973) , and Gomillion v.
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Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960), with Gaffney v. Cummings,
412 U.S. 735, 751-754 (1973). Petitioners have not objected
to the impact of the 1974 phm on the representation of white
voters in the 'county or in the State as a whole. As the
.Court of Appeals observed, the plan left white majorities in
approximately 70% of the assembly and senate districts in
Kings County, which had a countywide population that was
65% white. Thus, even if voting in the county occurred
.strictly according to race, whites would not be underrepre.sen ted relative to their share of the population.
In individual districts where nonwhite majorities were
increased to approximately 65%, it became more likely, given
. racial bloc voting, that black candidates would be elected
instead of their white opponents, and it became less likely
. that white voters would be represented by a member of
their own race; but as long as whites in Kings County, as a
group, were provided with fair representation, we cannot con. elude that there was a cognizable discrimination against
whites or an abridgement of their-right to vote on the grounds
, of race. 24 Furthermore, the individual voter in the district
, with a nonwhite maj"ority has no constitutional complaint
merely because his candidate has lost out at the polls and his
district is represented by a person for whom he did not vote.
Some candidate, along with his supporters, always loses. See
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 15:>---160 (1971).
Where it occurs, voting for or against a candidate because
24

We also note that the white voter who as a result of the 1974
plan is in a district more likely to return a nonwhite representative will
be represented, to the extent that voting continues to follow raciaJ lines,
by legislators elected from majority white districts. The effect of the
reapportionment on whites in districts where nonwhite majorities have
been increased is thus mitigated by the preservation of white majority
districts in the rest of the county. See Note, 25 Stan. L. Rev. 84, 87
(1972). Of course, if voting docs not follow racial lines, the white voter
has little reason to complain that the percentage of nonwhites in his
district has been increa&ed.
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of his race is an unfortuna-te practice. But it i~ not rare;
in any district where it regularly happens, it is unlikely
that any candidate will be elected who is a member of the
race that is in the minority in that district. However
. disagreeable this result may be, there is no authority for the
proposition that the candidates who are found racially unacceptable by the majority, and the minority voters supporting
those candidates, have had their Fourteenth or Fifteenth
Amendment rights infringed by this process. Their position
is similar to that of the Democratic or Republican minority
that is submerged year after year by the adherents to the
majority party who tend to vote a straight party line.
It does not follow, however, that the State is powerless
to minimize the consequences of racial discrimination by
voters when it is regularly practiced at the polls. In Gaffney
v. Cummings, supra, the Court upheld a districting plan
"drawn with the conscious intent to .. . achieve a rough
approximation of the statewide political strengths of the
Democratic and Republican Parties." 412 U. S., at 752.
We there recognized that districting plans would be vulnerable under our cases if "racial or political groups have been
fenced out of the political process and their voting strength
invidiously minimized." Id., at 754 (emphasis added); but
that was not the case there, and no such purpose or effect
may be ascribed to New York's 1974 plan. Rather, that plan
can be viewed as seeking to alleviate the consequences of
racial voting at the polls and to achieve a fair allocation of
political power between white and nonwhite voters in Kings
'C ounty.
In this respect New York's revision of certain district lines
is little different in kind from the decision by a State in
which a racial minority is unable to elect representatives
from multimember districts to change to single-member dis•
tricting for the purpose of increasing minority representation.
·T his change might substantially increase minority repre•
~tnd
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sentation at the expense of white voters, who previously
elected all of the legislators but with single-member districts
could elect no more than their proportional share. If this
intentional reduction of white voting power would be consti..
tutionally permissible, as we think it would be, we think it
also permissible for a State, employing sound districting principles such as compactness and population equality, to at~
tempt to prevent racial minorities from being repeatedly out. voted by creating districts that will afford fair representation
to the members of those racial grqups who are sufficiently
numerous and whose residential patterns afford the opportu.
nity of creating districts in which they will be in the
majority.
As the Court said in Gaffney,
"[C]ourts have [no] constitutional warrant to invalidate
a state plan, otherwise within tolerable population limits,
because it undertakes, not to mini,mize or eliminate the
political strength of any group or party, but to recognize
it and, through districting, provide a rough ~ort of proportional representation in the legislative halls of the
State." Ibid.
New York was well within this rule when , under the circumstances present in Kings County, it amended its 1972

I

plan. 2 ~

The judgment is
Affirmed.
MR. JusTICE MARSHALL

took no part in the considera.tion

or decision of this case.
25 Petitioners seek to distinguish Gaffney on the ground that New
York's use of racial criteria was not the product of " reasoned choice"
by the state legisl ature but rather was coerced by federal officials. But
we do not think t hat this otherwise constitutionally prrmissible plan
was rendered unconstitutional merely because New York adopt<'cl it to
comply with a federal statute.

I

'I

February 16,
'~·\

,,

'!'(

75-104 United Jewish Organization
v. Carey

)'.Jl<

Dear Potter:.
:n.

'I
•

..

:rh

Please,, join me ~ your concurring opinion.
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No. 75-104 United Jewish Organization
Carey
Dear Byron:
I have concluded that Potter's concurring opinion
best reflects my thinking about this troublesome case.
It also leaves me more options for the future.

Accordingly, I am asking Potter to join me in his
concurrence.
I am not unaware of your substantial efforts to
accommodate our divergent views. It will not afford you
much comfort, but I do thank you.
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,Sincerely,

Mr.
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